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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
My dissertation evaluates technology adoption and transfer both theoretically and
empirically, with the goal of providing new insights into the consequences of technology
adoption an area that remains understudied in the macroeconomic literature.
I begin the investigation from the perspective of rms. The major aim of my second
chapter is to analyze the mechanism of technology adoption across rms under a framework
in which technology is transferred through mergers and acquisitions. In this chapter I
present a model that incorporates the cost of converting one rms specic capital into that
of another rm. I show that merger activity involves a pattern in which rms that have high-
market valuations with respect to the book value of their assets (i.e., Tobins Q) will merge
with rms that have lower yet not the lowest valuations. I also show that the ratio of bidder
to target Qs and the size di¤erential between acquirer and target have an inverted U-shaped
e¤ect on the probability of two rms being involved in a merger, and that the likelihood of
a merger is positively and linearly related to the relative potential growth between acquirer
and its target. In terms of potential growth, the typical merger pattern is high buys low.
Based on data for mergers among US rms available from the Securities Data Corporation
from 1986 to 2005, a series of bootstrap logistic regressions of the probability of an actual
merger on the ratio of bidder to target Qs, the two rms size di¤erential, their relative
potential growth, and other controls bear out the main implications of the model.
The third chapter provides a theoretical justication for the bootstrap logistic
regressions, a new simulation-based method, for rare events data in which the binary de-
pendent variables have dozens to thousands of times fewer ones (events, such as mergers)
1
than zeros (nonevents, such as pseudo mergers). The essentials of this method include
the following: First, the nonevents(pseudo mergers) are randomly selected to match the
events (mergers) and the logistic regression is applied. This procedure is then repeated
hundreds of times. We also construct the bootstrap standard errors and p values of the
estimates.
The last chapter analyzes the Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology
(CHAT) data set, which covers the di¤usion of about 110 technologies in over 150 countries
since 1820. We estimate and compare the convergence speed of each technological adoption
and that of income per capita across all countries, and then across the developed and devel-
oping countries (DCs and LDCs). We then document six general facts about cross-country
technology adoption and income inequality that emerge from these data: (i) Though DCs
always adopt a new technology earlier than LDCs, on average the convergence speed of tech-
nology adoption across LDCs is faster than that across DCs. (ii) Most technological adop-
tions among poorer economies cluster in a lower level than those among richer economies.
(iii) The convergence speed of the adoption of most technologies is non-monotone. (iv) The
invention of the computer and the internet has not increased the average convergence speed
of other technological adoptions. (v) The relation between the average convergence speed
of technological adoptions and that of per capita income is negative across all countries and
across LDCs, but is positive across DCs in the post-WWII period. (vi) The dispersion in
technology adoption for individual technology is 3 - 5 times larger than the dispersion in
income per capita both across DCs and LDCs.
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CHAPTER II
TECHNOLOGICAL DISTANCE, TOBINS Q, AND THE PROPENSITY TO MERGE
Introduction
According to the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), more than 3,700 rms were
involved in domestic within-industry corporate mergers between 1987 and 2006 with a total
transaction value in excess 4.7 trillion constant 2005 dollars. At the same time, the vast
majority of US companies were not involved in mergers. Accordingly, the topic of who
merges, and with whom do they merge, has received a great deal of attention in recent
economic and nancial research.
One of the most well-established stylized facts about the pattern of mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) is that rms with high values of Tobins Q (dened as the ratio of a
rms market value to the replacement cost of its capital) usually buy rms with low Qs.
Manne (1965), for example, argues that low value, badly-managed rms will be bought by
better-managed rms. Servaes (1991) nds that the total takeover returns, which measure
the abnormal increase in the combined values of the merging parties, are larger when the
bidder has a higher Q than its target. Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2001), report that
roughly two-thirds of mergers since 1973 involve an acquiring rm with a higher Q than
its target. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2007) provide a Q-theory of mergers to capture
these stylized facts.
Another group of researchers thinks that valuation errors a¤ect merger activity.
For example, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) pro-
vide theories suggesting that misvaluations drive mergers. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and
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Viswanathan (2005) nd strong empirical support for the prediction that increasing market
misvaluation of a rm increases the probability of being the acquirer when a merger occurs.
In this paper, we take a fresh look at who merges with whom. Our study is
motivated by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2007), who describe a theory of mergers in
which rms with high Qs acquire rms with low Qs, since the most value is created when
the worst performing assets are paired with the best managers. They argue that mergers are
a way for acquirers to pass their better technology to targets, or to substitute the targets
poor management or inappropriate use of assets with superior management and direction.
Synergies are created in all of these cases. In their papers, they assume that capital is rm
specic and a cost is needed to put new and used capital in place. When the conversion
cost is innite, there would be no net gains from a merger and thus no merger regardless
of the di¤erence between the counter partiesQs.
Figure 1. Tobins Q for subgroups of Compustat rms, 1986 - 2005
As Figure 1 shows, however, the Tobins Qs of rms that become acquirers, while
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larger than those of their targets, on average do not exceed those of the targets more than
they exceed the Qs of rms not involved in mergers at all.1 This suggests that a high Q
rm will purchase a rm with a lower, yet not the lowest Q; considering the conversion cost.
This phenomenon is the focus of our paper.
The high buys less highmerger pattern has been observed by Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson and Viswanathan (2005). Instead of explaining this pattern, Rhodes-Kropf and
Robinson (2007) suggest an even stronger pattern of like buys like, arguing that merg-
ers reect a desire to place complementary assets under common control more than the
substitution of badly performing assets with better ones.
Keeping the substitution assumption, however, we argue that a high buys lower
yet not the lowestpattern in terms of Q emerges from the rm specicity of capital and the
costs associated with converting a targets capital into a form usable by the acquirer. We
build a model based on three assumptions. First, we assume there is a positive technology
shock which a¤ects one group of rms more than the others. After this shock, two kinds
of rms will coexist. Second, like Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2007), we assume that
mergers are a channel through which capital ows from low technology projects to high
technology ones. Finally, we assume that the total conversion costs are a convex function
of the technological "distance" between the acquirer and its target. Firms negotiate to
determine how they will share the surplus generated by the merger. If a high-tech and
low-tech rm can make higher prots under common control than they can separately, they
will merge. Guided by the model developed in the paper, we conrm that merger activity
presents a pattern as high buys lower yet not the lowestin terms of Q, but high buys low
in terms of relative growth potentials. We also prove the following results:
1The annual averages presented in Figure 1 all constructed for US rms listed on Standard & Poors
Compustat database from 1986 to 2005. We identify mergers among these rms using information from the
Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
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(1) The ratio of bidder to its target Qs has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on the
probability of the two rms being involved in a merger. This means the bidder may not
purchase the lowest Q rm that it can nd, but rather a rm with a lower Q:
(2) The likelihood of a merger is positively and linearly related to the relative
potential growth between an acquirer and its prospective target, which means that the
likelihood of a merger is larger when the potential growth of the acquirer is sizeable relative
to its target. Therefore, the relative potential growth is a more potent variable than Q in
characterizing what drives merger activity.
We restrict our data to US domestic merger activities reported in the SDC and US
exchange companies from 1986 to 2005. We pool a dataset with 1,317 merger pairs among
3,050,489 observations. Our data support the merger pattern of high buys lower yet not
the lowestin terms of Q. At the same time, we nd the average total factor productivity
(i.e., TFP, measured as the ratio of net sales to assets) of the targets is greater than that of
the acquirers and that the average TFP of non-merging rms exceeds that of the targets,
with both of these di¤erences statistically signicant at the one percent level. This implies
that the non-merging rms are the most productive on average, while the target rms
are second and the acquirers last, which runs counter to the implication of Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002, 2007). Further, we nd that the number of acquirers and targets are not
the same, as many potential mergers with multiple bidders appear in the SDC data but are
not completed. These ndings lead us to focus on the di¤erences between the ratio of bidder
to target Qs and the two rmstechnological distance, considering only actual mergers and
potential within-industry pairings.
Using the data, we construct a series of quasi-bootstrap logistic regressions of the
probability of an actual merger on the ratio of bidder to target Qs, the two rms size
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di¤erential, their relative potential growth, and other controls. We then provide bootstrap
tests for all estimates. These regressions bear out the main implications of the model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a
Nash bargaining solution model that incorporates a cost of converting capital. In Section
3, we describe the construction of the data. In Section 4, we introduce a new econometric
method. In Section 5, we make an empirical assessment of our theoretical model. In Section
6, we conclude.
Model
The model is based on Gort (1969) as well as Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2007).
In an economy, some rms are well positioned to take advantage of a shock, while others
are not. Hence, after a positive technology shock, some rms are more productive than
others. We model this as two kinds of technology with a distinct type of capital. Capital
is technology-specic, as in Hulten (1992) and Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000). Given that
the high and the low technology rms face the same output price, the high technology rms
make better use of the assets they control and thus they have a higher Q than the low
technology rms. As a result, the rms with high technology have a desire to expand their
market share and nd it optimal to acquire plants from less productive rms in the industry,
even when it entails costs to convert the capital associated with low technology. By the
same token, a positive shock in an industry increases the opportunity cost of operating as an
ine¢ cient producer in that industry. In a sense, merger and acquisition (M&A) are often
the least-cost means for industry structure to respond to the changes brought about by
economic shocks. Thus, a positive industry shock alters the value of the assets and creates
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incentives for transfers to more productive users through M&A.2
All rms in the model are assumed to be price-takers, to produce a homogenous
output, to be endowed with technology-specic production assets, and to have the same
technology initially. At time 0, there is a positive technology shock that a¤ects one group
of rms more than the other. Hence, after the shock, there are two kinds of technology, each
associated with one kind of assets. High and low technology are respectively represented
by zh and zl, with zh > zl. The high technology asset is denoted as Kh; while the low
technology asset is denoted as Kl: Since the technology-specic assets Ki can be directly
used only by the rms with technology zi; a cost is needed to convert low technology assets
to high technology uses.3 In this model the cost is assumed to be a convex function of
the technological distance between these two rms. Namely, the larger the technological
distance, the higher is the cost incurred to convert the capital associated with the low
technology. After merging, the combined rm inherits the technology from high productivity
rm and also its latent intangibles, so the combined rm has the same Q as the high
productivity rm. It is also assumed that the acquirer and its target arrive at a Nash
bargaining solution to share the rents.4
Under a rational stock market, a rms value can be written as
Vi = qiKi; i = h or l; (II.1)
where Vi is the market value of the rm, and qi is the Tobins Q of rm i that assigns a
market value to a given replacement cost of all its assets.
2Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) document that the rate of corporate takeovers and restructurings within
industries during 1980s is directly related to the economic shocks.
3See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2007), and Jovanovic (2006).
4Di¤erent choices for negotiating prots will not change the main results of the model.
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After merging, the new rms value function can be written as
VM = (1  C)qhKl + qhKh; (II.2)
where VM is the market value of the combined rms and qh is its Tobins Q. C is the per
unit cost to convert Kl into Kh; which satises C 0 > 0; C 00 > 0, C(1) = C 0(1) = 0 and
lim zh
zl
!+1C(
zh
zl
) = +1:
We use a model of negotiations to determine how pre-merger rms share the surplus
generated by the merger. There are di¤erent choices for the model of negotiations, but the
simplest one is the Nash bargaining solution, which in this case is just the solution to
W (Vh; Vl) = max
hM ;lM
(hM   Vh)(lM   Vl)(1 ) (II.3)
s:t: VM = hM +lM
where W is the joint welfare of the aquirer and its target, iM is the merger share to rm
i, and  2 [0; 1] is the acquirers bargaining weight. The larger  implies a lower bargaining
power of the target.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium the resulting merger share for high-tech rm merging with low-
tech rm is
hM = (VM   Vh   Vl) + Vh; (II.4)
lM = (1  )(VM   Vh   Vl) + Vl: (II.5)
Proposition 1 Assume at time 0, the rms a¤ected by a positive technology shock adopt a
high technology immediately, while the others use the low technology. If the combined market
value of the total assets of a high-tech rm and a low-tech rm is higher under common
control than it is separately, they will merge immediately at time 0.
Proof. If the high-tech and low-tech rms merge at time s, then rm hs market
9
value at time 0 is
Vhs =
Z s
0
(e rtrVh)dt+ e rshM
= Vh   e rsVh + e rs[(VM   Vh   Vl) + Vh]
= Vh + e
 rs(VM   Vh   Vl) (since (VM   Vh   Vl) > 0)
< Vh + (VM   Vh   Vl) = Vh0 (when s=0).
Therefore, Vhs < Vh0:
With the same logic, we can prove that Vls < Vl0:
Since both rms are worth more by merging at time 0 rather than waiting until a
later time s, they merge at time 0.
The proposition shows that mergers occur in waves and that technological shocks
drive industry merger waves. Several papers provide strong empirical supports for this
proposition, such as Faria (2003) and Harford (2005).
If the high technology and the low technology rms merge at time 0, the gain for
each rm from the merger is5
Gh = hM   Vh = (VM   Vh   Vl) + Vh   Vh = (VM   Vh   Vl);
Gl = lM   Vl = (1  )(VM   Vh   Vl) + Vl   Vl = (1  )(VM   Vh   Vl):
The two rms will merge if and only if Gi > 0; which is equivalent to VM Vh Vl >
0; or
Gh +Gl = (1  C)qhKl + qhKh   qhKh   qlKl > 0; (II.6)
5Since merger will happen right after the technolgy shock, we disregard time index.
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After rearranging,
qh
ql
>
1
1  C( zhzl )
: (II.7)
However, since C is a convex function of zhzl ; zi is a technology parameter that represents the
total factor productivity (TFP), and qi is actually a function of zi; this inequality cannot
be directly used to predict whether a merger will occur. TFP reects a rms current and
past performance, while Tobins Q is an expected protability based on a rms ex post and
current performance. In other words, Tobins Q not only measures the relation between
TFP and market value, but also measures the relation between latent intangibles and market
value.6 If there are no latent intangibles, Q and TFP are equivalent, which is what Jovanovic
and Rousseau (2002, 2007) implicitly assume. In our model, however, the high-tech rm is
better equipped to adopt a new technology than the low-technology rm. This means that
high-technology rms have a greater latent ability to adopt an advanced technology than
low-technology rms, and therefore have higher growth potential. Q includes this latent
ability (e.g. perhaps more exible management), while TFP does not. Therefore, Q and
TFP are not equivalent. Nevertheless, Q and TFP are positively correlated. Indeed, Dwyer
(2001) shows that the plant-level productivity and the market value of a rm are positively
related, and a manufacturing technique with high productivity acts as an intangible asset
for the rm that owns it. In this paper, we introduce a new variable i which is a rms Q
deating by its TFP. This should measure the rms latent adoptability of a new technology
and also its growth potential. We dene
6Griliches (1981) and Cockburn & Griliches (1988) report there is a signicant relation between the
market value of a rm and its unanticipated intangible capital.
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i =
qi
zi
; i = h or l; (II.8)
where a higher i implies a higher growth potential. Next we dene  =
h
l
as the relative
growth potentials of two rms. When the dispersion between h and l is larger,  is larger.
Dene the ratio of an acquirer to a target Qs, qhql ; as qr; with qr  1; and the ratio
of bidder to target productivity, zhzl ; as zr; with zr  1: Gh +Gl normalized by the value of
low technology rm can be simplied as
g(qr) =
Gh +Gl
Kl  ql = qr(1  C)  1 > 0: (II.9)
Thus g(qr) measures the gain from merging as a share of the low technology rms pre
merger value.
When g(qr) > 0, the two rms will merge. When g(qr)  0, the two rms will not
merge regardless of the di¤erence between the acquirer and target Qs.
Proposition 2 Given qr  1 and  > 0 : The distance between the potential acquirer and
target Qs has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on the probability of a merger.
Proof. Since zhzl  1 and
zh
zl
= qr ; C can be written as a function of
qr
 and qr  :
The two rms will merge if and only if g(qr) > 0: We can calculate
g(1) = 0; (II.10)
g() =   1; (II.11)
g0(qr) = 1  C   qr

C 0; (II.12)
g0() = 1 > 0; (II.13)
g00(qr) =  2 1

C
0   qr
2
C 00: (II.14)
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Since C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0 when qr > ; g00(qr) < 0 holds. Consequently, g(qr) is a
concave function of qr:
When qr ! +1; C( qr )! +1 given : Therefore g(qr)!  1 and g0(qr)!  1
when qr ! +1:
Since g0() > 0, g0(qr) !  1 when qr ! +1 and g00(qr) < 0; there exists a qr ;
such that g0(qr ) = 0; and for any qr 2 [; qr ); g0(qr) > 0; for any qr 2 (qr ;+1); g0(qr) < 0:
Hence g(qr ) = maxqr2[;+1) g(qr):When g(q

r )  0; no merger occurs. When g(qr ) > 0; the
di¤erence between the potential acquirers and targets Qs has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect
on the probability of a merger, since g00(qr) < 0:
For example, when C = c( zhzl   1)2 we can solve for qr as follows:
qr 2
 
2
3
  
3
r
1 +
3
c
;
2
3
+

3
r
1 +
3
c
!
() g0(qr) > 0: (II.15)
In equation II.15, g(qr) increases until qr =
2
3 +

3
q
1 + 3c ; which corresponds to
the maximum value of g(qr): Figure 2 shows that the relative Q between bidder and its
target has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on the potential gains from a merger.
g(x)
qr
qr*
*
0
Figure 2. Gains from mergers
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If g(qr ) < 0 (i.e., lies beneath the horizontal axis in Figure 2), no merger occurs
regardless of the di¤erence between the two rmsQs. For instance, if c is too large,
g(qr ) < 0 will hold.
If g(qr ) > 0; a merger occurs. There are two cases:
Case 1: 23   3
q
1 + 3c  1 < qr :
For any qr 2 [1; qr ) ; g0(qr) > 0: This means g(qr) is increasing in the range of
[1; qr ) :
For any qr 2 [qr ;+1) ; g0(qr) < 0 and limqr!+1g(qr) =  1: This means g(qr) is
decreasing in the range of [qr ;+1) : Hence, there exists qr such that g(qr ) = 0 and g(qr)
will be negative when qr > qr : Consequently, we have a range (1; qr ) such that for any
qr 2 (1; qr ), g(qr) > 0 also holds, and the two rms will merge.
Case 2: 1 < 23   3
q
1 + 3c < q

r :
Since g(1) = 0 and g0(qr) < 0 for any qr 2

1; 23   3
q
1 + 3c

; g

2
3   3
q
1 + 3c

<
0: Using the same logic as in case 1, we can show there exists q21r and q
22
r such that
q21r 2

2
3   3
q
1 + 3c ; q

r

; q22r 2 (qr ;1) ; g(q21r ) = 0; and g(q22r ) = 0: Then, for any
valid qr 2 (q21r ; q22r ), it follows that g(qr) > 0 and the two rms merge.
This proposition is striking precisely because it demonstrates that the distance
between the acquirer and its target Qs is non-monotonically related to the likelihood of
a merger. This inverted U-shape stands in contrast to the Q-theory of mergers, which
suggests high market-to-book rms simply acquire those with low market-to-book values.
Thus, in our model, an acquirer may not purchase the lowest Q rm that it can nd, but
rather a rm with a lower Q. The model also implies that the probability of being involved
in a merger depends on . A rm with greater ability to adopt new techniques and a higher
growth potential is likely to hold more capital and to acquire other rms. A rm with less
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ability to adopt new techniques and a lower growth potential will be in an inferior position
in future competition, so it will be more likely to be acquired by high productivity rms.
Thus, when the relative potential growth between the acquirer and its target is high, the
probability of a merger is high. The following proposition states how mergers are a¤ected
by the rmssize di¤erential and their relative growth potential.
Proposition 3 Given qr  1; and  > 0 : the probability of merger is positively and linearly
related to :
Proof. The maximum value of function g can be simplied as follows.
Dene G = max g(qr) = qr   qrC( q

r
 )   1: A larger value of G implies a larger
likelihood of a merger, since there is a greater probability that g(qr) exceeds zero.
The e¤ect of  on G is
dG
d
=
@G
@qr
dqr
d
+
(qr )2
2
C 0; (II.16)
d2G
d2
=
@G
@qr
d2qr
d2
+
@2G
@(qr )2

dqr
d
2
+
2qr
2
C 0
dqr
d
+
(qr )2
3
C 00
dqr
d
+
2qr
2
C 0
dqr
d
+
(qr )2
3
C"
dqr
d
  2(q

r )
2
3
C 0   (q

r )
3
4
C 00
=
@G
@qr
d2qr
d2
+
@2G
@(qr )2

dqr
d
2
  2 @
2G
@(qr )2
qr

dqr
d
+
@2G
@(qr )2
qr

2
; (II.17)
since
@G(qr )
@qr
= 1  C   q

r

C 0;
@2G
@(qr )2
=  2 1

C
0   q

r
2
C 00:
According to the envelope theorem, dGd =
(qr )2
2
C 0 > 0: And since
g0(qr ) = 1  C

qr


  q

r

C 0

qr


= 0;
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we have
dg0(qr )
d
= 0 =

  1

C
0   q

r
2
C 00

dqr
d
  q

r


=
@2G
@(qr )2

dqr
d
  q

r


:
Since @
2G
@(qr )2
< 0; dq

r
d =
qr
 holds. Substituting
dqr
d =
qr
 into (16), we get
d2G
d2
= 0:
Since @G@ > 0 and
d2G
d2
= 0; G is a linear and increasing function of : This means
that the likelihood of a merger rises with .
Proposition 3 highlights the factors which a¤ect mergers. Di¤erences in the growth
potentials have a signicant e¤ect on the propensity to merge. Propositions 2 and 3 show
that while Q is not a linear factor a¤ecting mergers,  is. Because the conversion cost, a
convex function of the relative technological distance between the two merging rms, drives
the high productivity rm to purchase a rm with lower but not the lowest productivity,
and because Q positively relates to TFP, a high Q rm buys a lower yet not the lowest
Q rm. However, ; which is Q deated by TFP, is positively and linearly related to the
likelihood of a merger. Consequently,  is a more potent variable than Q in characterizing
what drives merger activity.
In light of the theoretical observations on who merges with whom and which factors
a¤ect mergers, our next task is to test whether the data on US mergers are consistent with
the theory.
Data Construction and Description
We restrict the empirics to data on domestic mergers available from Thompsons
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) for rms traded on US stock exchanges. Since we
compare actual mergers with potential ones, we proceed to construct a dataset for empirical
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testing in ve steps.
First, we collect annual data items from 1986 to 2005 for the 22,888 rms listed
on the 2006 version of the Compustat database, excluding rms with less than two years of
sales data, and classify them according to the twelve industry groupings dened by Fama
& French.7 We then measure Tobins Q as the ratio of market-to-book values for each
rm.8 Since total factor productivity (TFP) is a measure of the economic e¢ ciency of a
rms operations, we measure it as the ratio of net sales to the book value of total assets
(Compustat item 12 divided by item 6).9 We refer to this dataset of listed rms and their
accounting data as the "Compustat" le.
Second, we select US domestic mergers listed on the SDCs Mergers and Acquisi-
tions Database from 1987 to 2006, excluding repurchases and leveraged buyouts. To avoid
double-counting multiple announcements of the same merger, we work with only one obser-
vation per calendar year for each unique acquirer-target pair. We then separate the targets
and their corresponding merger information from the acquirers and their corresponding in-
formation. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the merger data that we use. From
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1, we can see that the acquirers and targets are not matched.
Third, we match each target with its Compustat accounting data from the end of
the scal year preceding the merger announcement (from step 1), and refer to the resulting
7The 12 Industry Portfolios classcation based on the four-digit SIC code can be found through the
following link: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
8Following Jovanovic and Rousseau (2007), the numerator of Q is the sum of common equity at current
share prices (the product of Compustat items 24 and 25), the book values of preferred stock (item 130) and
short- and long-term debt (items 34 and 9). The denominator is the sum of the book values of common
equity (item 60), preferred stock (item 130), and short- and long-term debt (items 34 and 9). We omitted
Qs for rms with negative values for net common equity since they imply negative market to book ratios,
and eliminated observations with market-to-book values in excess of 100, since many of these were likely to
be serious data errors.
9The average ratio of the acquirers asset divided by the number of its employees to that of its target is
1.93, the median is 1.2, and the standard deviation is 3.32. For acquirers, the correlation between assets
and the ratio of asset to the number of employees is 0.33, and that for targets is 0.34.
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Table 1. Summary statistics of observations in each industry
Industry No. observations per year Merger activity
Mean Min. Max. Acquirers Targets Total
(1)Consumer nondurables 280 200 343 646 340 986
(2)Consumer durables 133 91 175 280 139 419
(3)Manufacturing 548 397 711 1,344 663 2,007
(4)Energy 125 88 159 455 155 610
(5)Chemicals 101 79 117 255 128 383
(6)Computers,software,etc. 803 465 1,172 2,966 1,050 4,016
(7)Telephone and TV 145 72 241 512 241 753
(8)Utilities 177 118 225 250 123 373
(9)Wholesale 492 348 640 1,057 567 1,624
(10)Medical 342 173 442 1,095 503 1,598
(11)Finance 643 380 985 2,135 839 2,974
(12)Everything else 580 422 808 1,455 717 2,172
Note: Industry denitions are taken from Fama and French. Merger activity is measured by the
number of rms involved in mergers in each industry.
dataset as the "SDC targets".
Fourth, we take the Cartesian product of the "Compustat" le (with acquirers
agged) and the SDC targets le (from step 3) in each year and for each industry to create
a database of all possible pairs. In other words, our nal data set contains each observation
from the SDC target le merged with every observation in the same year and the same
industry from the agged Compustat le. (i.e., each target is paired with its actual acquirer
as well as its potential acquirers.) This is important because our model analyzes the case
where the targets technology is substituted with a better technology, and if two rms are
not in the same industry, their assets are more likely to be complements than substitutes.
Finally, we identify whether each pair is the actual within-industry merging pair or
the pseudo merging pair. The nal dataset includes 1,317 actual merger pairs and 3,054,479
potential transactions.
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Econometric Method
In this paper, we are discussing the probability of two rms being involved in a
merger, the value of which should be between 0 and 1, so logistic regression is desirable.
After pooling all actual and pseudo mergers and running a logistic regression, however, we
can not get convergent results. In order to get convergent and e¢ cient estimates, the quasi-
bootstrap logistic regressions, a new econometric method, is constructed. The procedure
includes four steps. Step 1, we randomly select 1,317 pseudo-merger pairs with replacement
for each logistic regression, making sure that the number of actual and pseudo-mergers
from each industry are the same (as in Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson 2007, which is called
RR henceforth). Step 2, we match the randomly selected pseudo-transactions to the actual
merger sample, and then do a logistic regression. In the third step, we repeat Steps 1 and
2 for 100 times, and then report the mean and the standard deviation of the estimated
coe¢ cients. In the last step, we use bootstrap to test the statistical signicance of each
estimate. Since we randomly select 1,317 pseudo-merger pairs with replacement for each
logistic regression, our selected sample is choice-based. Thereby, we correct our estimates
from the quasi-bootstrap logistic regressions. The remainder of this section is organized as
follows. First, we provide a theoretical justication to explain the e¢ ciency of our estimates.
We then present the bootstrap tests for the statistical signicance of each estimate in detail.
In addition, we provide the justication for the correction of the estimates.
E¢ ciency of the Quasi-bootstrap Logistic Regressions
Assume the set N includes all the dependent variable Yi0 = 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n0; and
the set M includes all the dependent variable Yj1 = 1; j = 1; 2; :::; n1: It is also assumed
that n0 >> n1; which means that n0 is dozens to thousands of times more than n1: And
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then the fraction of ones in the population,  ; equals n1n0+n1 : Given some regressors xi; the
goal is to estimate P (Yi1 = 1j xi); as this is the full conditional distribution. We assume
that the underlying distribution of the dependent variable is logistic, P (Yi1 = 1jxi) can be
expressed as:
P (Yi1 = 1jxi) = 1
1 + e x
0
i
;
where  is the true parameters for the choice-based sample.
We construct a new set At; t = 1; 2; :::; T; which contains n1 observations randomly
selected with replacement from N: And then we run a logistic regression using all the
observations from At and M; t = 1; 2; :::; T . From this procedure, we can get T estimates
of ; which are
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
:
For some T  T weight matrix W> 0; let
JT () = T
0BBBBBBBBBB@
(^1   )=T
:
:
(^T   )=T
1CCCCCCCCCCA
0
W
0BBBBBBBBBB@
(^1   )=T
:
:
(^T   )=T
1CCCCCCCCCCA
(II.18)
We use the minimum distance method (MDM ) to dene an estimator which
minimizes JT ():We set W as the identity matrix. The solution of  for minimizing JT ()
is the mean of
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
: We dene ^ is the MDM estimate,
^ =
PT
t=1 ^t
T
: (II.19)
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Since all the estimators
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
share some dependent variables M;n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
are not independent from each other. To get more e¢ cient estimate, we
better set W as the variance-covariance of f^1; ^2; :::; ^T g; which is unknown and can not
be constructed easily. That means, the estimate ^ is not the most e¢ cient, when W is the
identity matrix. However, it still has the following asymptotic properties.
Claim 1 The asymptotic properties of ^ are:
(1) ^ !p : (2)
(2) Under H0 :  = 0;
p
T (^)!d N(0; 2); where 2 is unknown. (3)
(3) ^ is more e¢ cient than the estimator from RR one time logistic regression.
Since 2 is unknown, we can not directly test the statistical signicance of ^:
Instead, we use a simulation method called the bootstrap. From the bootstrap samples, we
perform bootstrap tests on the basis of bootstrap P values.
Bootstrap Tests
To obtain the bootstrap samples, we use four steps:
Step 1. Draw with replacement n1 observations from M ;
Step 2. Draw with replacement n1 observations from At; and combine them with
the sample we obtain in Step 1;
Step 3. Run logistic regression using each combined sample from Step 2;
Step 4. Repeat Steps 1-3 B times.10
Hence, we dene set Ntb that includes n1 observations randomly drew with re-
placement from each At; and set Mtb that includes n1 observations randomly drew with
replacement from M; where t = 1; 2; :::; T and b = 1; 2; :::; B: Next, we run a logistic re-
gression using all the observations from sets Ntb and Mtb; and denote the estimator as
10According to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), if we will perform a bootstrap test at level ; then B
should be choosen to satisfy the condition that (B + 1) is an integer.
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^

tb:
We dene that
^

b =
PT
t=1 ^

tb
T
; b = 1; 2; :::; B; (II.20)
which is constructed in the same way as that of ^. And then the standard deviation ofn
^

b ; b = 1; 2; :::; B
o
will be the standard error of our quasi bootstrap estimates, which is
called quasi bootstrap standard error in this paper. Since the mean of ^

b is ^ and the null
hypothesis H0 is  = 0, we take ^

b   ^ as the simulated test statistics. There are two cases
to construct the empirical distribution function (EDF) based on the one-sided test.
If the alternative hypothesis H1 is  > 0; then the EDF is
F^ (^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^  ^): (II.21)
Our estimate of the true P value for this case is therefore
p^(^) = 1  F^ (^) = 1  1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^ < ^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b > 2^): (II.22)
The last equality in II.22 means that the true P value is approximated by the proportion
of simulations, in which ^

b is greater than 2^: For example, if B = 599; and 25 of all the
^

b are greater than 2^; then p^
(^) = 25=599 = 0:042: As a result in this example, we would
reject the null hypothesis that  = 0 at 5 percent statistic signicant level.
If the alternative hypothesis H1 is  < 0; then the EDF is
F^ (^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^  ^): (II.23)
Our estimate of the true P value is
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p^(^) = 1  F^ (^) = 1  1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^  ^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b < 2^): (II.24)
If B is innitely large, the EDF converges to the true conditional distribution
function (CDF). Consequently, our procedure would yield an exact test and the outcome of
the test would be the same as the P value computed by using the conditional distribution
function (CDF) of ^.
Correction for the Estimates
Our above method use a "matched-pairs" design, which results in a sample pro-
portion of merged pair rms of 0.50. This type of sampling implies typically that the
proportion of merged pairs in the sample is much larger than the proportion of such com-
panies in the grant population of all pairs (merged and non-merged). This "matched-pairs"
design causes a "choice-based sample bias" of the constant and the coe¢ cients in estimated
standard probit/logit models, in turn meaning that the probabilities being assessed in such
models are more or less biased. Hence, we provide the correction for the estimates from the
above quasi bootstrap logistic regressions.
Since the fraction of ones in the population,  , is known, we can use the prior
correction for the logit model (see King and Zeng, 2001). For the logit model, in any
of the above sampling designs, the estimated parameters except the constant item, ^0; is
statistically consistent estimates of the true parameters, but the unbiased estimate ^
c
0 for
the constant item is
^0   ln

(
1  

)

; (II.25)
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because ^0 =
PT
t=1 ^

t0
T ; and the correction for the constant item ^

t0 of each logistic regression
is ^

t0   ln

(1  )

:11
Evidence
In this section we begin by checking the basic model assumptions and their im-
plications for the data. Next, we investigate the relation between log q and log z that
emerges from the data. Then, using the econometric method constructed in Section 4, we
ask whether the high buys lower but not the lowestpattern that we observe for Q is an
artifact of another phenomenon such as rmsrelative sizes or relative cash holdings by in-
cluding these indicators as controls in a multiple regression framework. We also investigate
the high-buys-low pattern that we observe for relative growth by testing the sensitivity of
the likelihood of a merger to  after including these same control variables. Finally, we
repeat the analysis allowing a common covariance structure across industries to test the
robustness of our ndings.
Basic Model Assumptions and their Implications for the Data
Using the sample of 1,317 actual merger transactions from the SDC database, we
rst investigate whether acquirers typically absorb targets with lower market-to-book ratios,
while at the same time avoiding potential targets with the lowest market-to-book ratios in
the economy. Table 2 includes pooled summary statistics of book values, the market value
of all nancial assets, and the market value of common equity in millions of 2005 US dollars
11From King and Zeng (2001), if the propotion of Y=1 in the selected sample is ; the corrected estimate
is consistent for constant item 0 :
^0   ln

1  



1  

:
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for acquirers, targets, and rms not involved in a merger for each year from 1986 to 2005,
along with the average values of Tobins Q and z.12 The table shows that the average Q
of acquirers is nearly 13 times greater than that of targets but that we can not distinguish
targetsQs from those of non-merging rms. This nding that acquirers usually have higher
Qs than their targets is consistent with Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2007).
Table 2. Characteristics of nonmerging, target and acquiring rms before matching
Variable Nonmerging rms Target Acquirer t(T-N) t(A-T)
Observations 69,598 5,465 12,450
Market value 4,286 2,293 8,427 -6.90 12.68
Book value 2,738 1,565 4,388 -5.25 8.81
Market equity 2,652 1,286 5,764 -8.52 14.29
Tobins Q 2.149 2.096 2.837 -1.54 12.86
z 1.088 1.051 0.941 -2.98 -8.53
Note: The data are from the Compustat database, and are pooled observations from 1986 to 2005.
Acquirers and targets are not matched. "Market value" is measured as the sum of the value of
common stock (the product of items 24 and 25), preferred stock (item 130), and short and long-term
debt (items 34 and 9), with the latter three components as book values. "Book value" replaces
the market value of common stock in the above calculation with its book value (item 60). "Market
equity" is simply the market value of common stock. All measures are constructed from end-of-year
data and are converted to millions of 2005 dollars. T statistics for the di¤erences in means across
groups appear in columns 4 and 5, with *** representing statistical signicance at 1 percent level.
At the same time, row 6 of Table 2 reports that the average z (measured as the
ratio of net sales to assets) of the targets is greater than that of the acquirers and that the
average z of non-merging rms exceeds that of the targets, with both of these di¤erences
statistically signicant at the one percent level. This implies that the non-merging rms are
the most productive on average, while the target rms are second and the acquirers last,
which runs counter to the models implication. At the same time, the average z for the
three groups are actually quite close. Further, as Table 1 shows, the number of acquirers
and targets are not the same, as many potential mergers with multiple bidders appear in
12We restrict the sample to include only those rms with market values of equity that exceed $10 million.
25
the SDC data but are not completed. For this reason, and because the model focuses on
the relative growth potential of horizontal merger pairs, Table 3 focuses on the di¤erences
in the models key parameters (zr and qr) at the industry level, considering only actual
mergers and potential within-industry pairings.
Table 3. Summary statistics of zr and qr in each industry
Industry zr qr
Pseudo-merger Merger t(M-N) Pseudo-merger Merger t(M-N)
mean mean mean mean
(1)Consumer nondurables 1.331 1.023 -2.11 2.260 1.661 -2.77
(2)Consumer durables 1.149 0.891 -1.39 1.916 1.719 -0.74
(3)Manufacturing 1.260 1.010 -2.63 1.925 1.554 -2.58
(4)Energy 1.785 1.241 -1.70 1.679 1.253 -3.44
(5)Chemicals 1.199 1.035 -1.05 2.115 1.401 -1.32
(6)Computers,software,etc. 2.007 1.262 -1.85 3.347 2.081 -5.44
(7)Telephone and TV 4.763 1.120 -0.79 2.163 1.126 -4.33
(8)Utilities 1.247 1.012 -1.47 1.215 1.096 -2.36
(9)Wholesale 1.410 1.023 -2.54 2.376 1.656 -3.48
(10)Medical None
(11)Finance 3.766 0.972 -1.31 1.841 1.145 -6.29
(12)Everything else 4.335 1.033 -0.53 2.596 1.465 -3.40
Note: t(M-N) in columns 4 and 7 is the t staitistics for the di¤erences of zr and qr in means across
groups, respectively. *, **, and *** represent statistical signicance at the 10 percent, 5 percent,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 respectively report the average of zr of the pseudo-
merging pairs and the actual merging pairs in each industry. Nine of the eleven averages
listed in column 2 are greater than 1, which highlights that on average the acquirer is
more e¢ cient than its target when a merger actually occurs. At the same time, column 1
shows that the zr associated with potential yet non-merging pairs are higher in all instances
than those associated with actual mergers. Column 3 shows that the di¤erence in mean zr
between merging rms and potential mergers is statistically signicant at conventional levels
for 5 of the 11 industries. This means that on average the technological distance between the
actual merging pairs is less than that of the pseudo merging pairs. The results displayed in
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columns 1 - 3 of the table also suggest that the pooled (i.e., unmatched) summary statistics
in Table 2 are misleading.
The last three columns of Table 3 reports the average qr of the pseudo-merging
and actual merging pairs by industry, and shows that acquirers have higher Qs on average
than their targets in each industry when the merger occurs. Once again, however, the t-
statistics for the null hypothesis that actual mergers have the same qr as potential mergers
are all negative and for the most part statistically signicant. This indicates that on average
the relative Qs of the actual merging pairs is lower than that of the pseudo pairs in each
industry. That is to say, a high Q rm purchases a rm associated with a lower but not the
lowest Q.
All the observations from Table 3 are consistent with the theoretical implications
that a high Q rm will buy a rm with a lower yet not the lowest Q.13 In the next section,
we test the implications of our model and explore the high-buys-lower pattern in terms of
relative potential growth.
Relation between Q and TFP
Table 4 reports results from the pooled regressions of qi;t on zi;t from 1986 to
2005. Column 1 reports the baseline OLS regression. The estimated coe¢ cient of log zi;t is
0.076 and is statistically signicant at the one percent level. Columns 2 and 3 show that
this result is robust to the inclusion of xed e¤ects for industries and time. Since current
technology is highly correlated with that of the previous year ( = :88), columns 4 and 5
repeat the results from two-step least squares (2SLS) regressions, in which ve annual lags
of the rms TFP and 12-industry dummies are used as instruments. In both regressions
13Even after excluding potential pairs where the pseudo-target has a higher Q than its pseudo-acquirer,
we still nd that on average the actual mergersx is signicantly smaller than that of the pseudo mergers
in each industry. We do not report these results in this paper, but they are available upon request.
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Table 4. Pooled regressions of qi;t on zi;t; 1986-2005
OLS(1) OLS(2) OLS(3) IV(1) IV(2)
Const. 0.565 0.519 0.643 0.445 0.581
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
log(zi;t) 0.076 0.072 0.077 0.101 0.111
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Industry E¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E¤ect Yes Yes
Obs. 86,863 86,863 86,863 40,573 40,573
R2 0.151 0.114 0.153 0.100 0.123
Note: The dependent variable is log(qi;t). The IV(1) and IV(2) regressions use ve lags of
zi as instruments in the rst stage regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** represents
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level.
the correlation coe¢ cient between log qi;t and log zi;t is about 10 percent. Thus, Table 4
indicates that Q and TFP are positively correlated, which implies that productivity has an
implicit value, yet because the correlation between log qi;t and log zi;t is far below 1 they
can not be regarded as equivalent.14
E¤ects of qr and  on the Likelihood of Mergers by Controlling for Alter-
native Explanations
Our methodology compares mergers which actually occurred with mergers that
might have occurred but did not. This follows Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2007), which
randomly pairs any two non-merging rms to create a matched sample of pseudo-transaction
in which the sample of pseudo-mergers must have the same number of observations as the
sample of actual mergers. Our next step then estimates a series of logistic regressions
of the probability of being involved in a merger on combinations of zr; qr; ; and other
control variables. To obtain e¢ cient estimates from the logistic, we adopt the econometric
method presented in Section 4 and we set T = 100 and B = 599. That is to say, we
14Dwyer (2001) nds a positive relation between plant-level productivity and the market value of a rm
that is consistent with our data.
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repeat randomly selecting pseudo-transactions with replacement to match the actual merger
sample and running a logistic regression for 100 times, and then report the mean and the
standard deviation of the estimated coe¢ cients as well as the bootstrap p values, and also
correct the constant item by subtracting 7.749, which equals ln
 
1 


and in our data
 = n1n0+n1 =
1;317
3;054;479+1;317 = 0:0004:
Table 5. Quasi-bootstrap logistic regressions for specications that control for k while also
allowing qr and zr to enter separately with both linear and quadratic terms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Const. -8.162 -7.977 -7.398 -7.211 -8.042 -7.849 -7.283 -7.090
(0.041) (0.053) (0.043) (0.060) (0.044) (0.059) (0.046) (0.066)
logk 0.889 0.900 0.803 0.813 0.875 0.883 0.765 0.771
(0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
(logk)2 -0.115 -0.116 -0.091 -0.092 -0.112 -0.113 -0.088 -0.088
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
logqr 0.612 0.613 0.613 0.613
(0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060)
(logqr)2 -0.405 -0.425 -0.412 -0.429
(0.043) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049)
logzr -0.066 -0.072 -0.059 -0.065
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064)
(logzr)2 -0.367 -0.378 -0.366 -0.376
(0.058) (0.061) (0.055) (0.058)
log_c_r No No 0.106 0.107 No No 0.135 0.136
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
(log_c_r)2 No No -0.029 -0.029 No No -0.135 -0.136
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ind. FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 2634 2634 2602 2602 2634 2634 2602 2602
Bootstrap 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: The reported estimates are the mean of each quasi bootstrap estimation. The quasi bootstrap
standard error is reported in parentheses. * and *** represent statistical signicance at the 10 percent and
1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 5 presents estimates from these quasi-bootstrap logistic regressions (with
standard deviation of the estimated coe¢ cients) for specications that control for rms
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size di¤erential (i.e., k) while also allowing qr and zr to enter separately with both linear
and quadratic terms. For example, in the rst column of the table, the coe¢ cient on log k is
0.889 and that of (log k)2 is -0.115, with both statistically signicant at the one percent level.
This indicates that the probability of a merger is a nonlinear function of the size di¤erential
between bidder and its target. The estimated coe¢ cients for log qr and (log qr)2 are 0.612
and -0.405 respectively, and both are also statistically signicant at one percent level. This
nding shows that the distance between acquirers Q and targets Q has a strongly inverted
U-shaped e¤ect on the probability of the two rms being involved in a merger, even after
controlling for the relative sizes of the acquirer and its target. Columns 2 - 4 of the table
show that this nding is robust to the inclusion of dummy variables for industries and after
controlling for the level of cash balances (log_c_r). Interestingly, and broadly consistent
with Jensens (1986) "free cash" hypothesis, cash-rich rms are also more likely to engage
in mergers with rms that are cash-poorer but not the poorest, though the e¤ect of the cash
holdings is small relative to that of k and qr. Based on the regression results in column 3,
for example, when qr = k =c_r=5, the partial e¤ect of log qr on the probability of a merger
is -0.001, that of log k is 0.001, and that of log_c_r is only 0.0002.15 Based on the results
in Table 5, we conclude that the merger pattern of high-buys-lower-yet-not-the-lowestin
terms of Q is reasonable and not driven by some alternative explanation.
Columns 5 - 8 in Table 5 indicate that the technological distance (zr) between an
acquirer and its target also has a nonlinear e¤ect on the likelihood of a merger. Another
observation from Table 5 is that (log zr)2 and (log qr)2 have very similar e¤ects on the
probability of two rms involved in a merger because the estimated coe¢ cients are very
close. For example, the estimated coe¢ cient of (log zr)2 is -0.367 in column 5, while that
15Cash_r is the ratio of acquirer to its target cash holdings and log_cash_r is the log of cash_r.
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of (log qr)2 is -0.405 in column 1. Their absolute di¤erence is only 0.038. Therefore, from
the denition of ; which is log  = log qr   log zr; we can say that log  has almost no
quadratic e¤ect on the probability of a merger. This means that log  a¤ects mergers in a
predominately linear fashion. We obtain similar results after controlling for industry xed
e¤ects and the relative cash holdings of acquirers and their potential and actual target and
report these results in columns 6 - 8.
Figure 3. qr, zr and s e¤ect on the probability of mergers
To illustrate our ndings, we simulate the e¤ects of log qr, log zr and log  on the
likelihood of a merger using the estimated coe¢ cients listed in column 1 and column 5
in Table 5 and present them in Figure 3.16 This gure shows that log qr and log zr have
an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on mergers, but their di¤erence (i.e., log ) a¤ects mergers
positively and linearly.17 Thus, in terms of ; the merger pattern is that rms with high
16Since the actural likelihood of a merger is close to zero, we simulate the probability of a merger with
uncorrected coe¢ cients and set log k = 1:5:
17Indeed, the "qr" e¤ect in Figure 3 is the empirical analog of Figure 1.
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growth potential tend to acquire rms with low potential, or simply put, that high buys
low.
Table 6. Quasi-bootstrap logistic regressions for specications that control for k while also
allowing  to enter with both linear and quadratic terms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Const. -8.261 -8.089 -7.504 -7.329 -8.047 -7.868 -7.291 -7.111
(0.038) (0.050) (0.039) (0.056) (0.045) (0.058) (0.047) (0.063)
logk 0.881 0.891 0.773 0.783 0.857 0.868 0.766 0.777
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
(logk)2 -0.121 -0.122 -0.098 -0.098 -0.112 -0.113 -0.090 -0.091
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
log 0.132 0.133 0.120 0.121 0.382 0.391 0.376 0.382
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062)
(log)2 -0.300 -0.308 -0.297 -0.302
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
log_c_r No No 0.131 0.1318 No No 0.112 0.112
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
(log_c_r)2 No No -0.029 -0.030 No No -0.028 -0.028
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ind. FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs 2634 2634 2602 2602 2634 2634 2602 2602
Bootstrap 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: The reported estimates are the mean of each quasi bootstrap estimation. The quasi bootstrap
standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent statistical signicance at the 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
In addition, in Table 6, we directly estimate the e¤ects of log  and (log )2 on
the probability of a merger, which control for k and the log of cash holdings. Columns 1
- 4 indicate that log  has a positive e¤ect on mergers, in which the estimated coe¢ cients
of log  are close to 0.13 and all are statistically signicant. When including (log )2 in
our regressions, we get a positive estimate on log  but a negative one for (log )2 on the
probability of an actual merger, with both statistically signicant at the one percent level.
However, the absolute values of the estimates of log  and (log )2 are smaller than that of
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log qr and (log qr)2 respectively. This indicates that the e¤ect of log  on mergers has less
curvature than that of log qr, and therefore that  more succinctly explains merger activity
than qr. For example, in column 5 of Table 6, the estimated coe¢ cient of log  is 0.382 and
that of (log )2 is -0.3, while the estimated coe¢ cient of log qr is 0.612 and that of (log qr)2
is -0.405 in column 1 of Table 5.
Figure 4. qr and s e¤ect on the probability of mergers
Based on the above estimates, Figure 4 displays the simulation results of the e¤ects
of log qr and log  on the likelihood of a merger.18 In Figure 4, the curve representing the
e¤ect of log  with its quadratic term has less curvature than that representing the e¤ect
of log qr with its quadratic term. This indicates that when both the linear and quadratic
terms of log qr and log  are considered, log  a¤ects the probability of an actual merger
more linearly than log qr: Indeed, though some curvature is apparent in the relationship
between the probability of merger and  when  enters the empirics explicitly, it remains
18Once again, we simulate the probability of a merger with uncorrected coe¢ cients and set log k = 1:5:
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quite nearly linear for ranges of  that we would most likely encounter in the data (say
log  < 1; i.e.,  < 2:73). In a word, the simulation results also support our theoretical
implication that log  is a more potent variable than log qr in characterizing what drives
mergers.
Robustness Tests
For robustness, we revisit the questions of who purchases whom and which factors
drive mergers using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) methods.19 The results are
reported in Tables 7 and 8. We use the same strategy as Section 4 randomly selecting
1,317 pseudo mergers from all possible mergers on each of 100 iterations of an SUR logistic
regression, with Table 7 showing the means of the estimated coe¢ cients from the 100
logistic regressions of the probability of an actual merger on the Kronecker Products of
(log k, (log k)2; log qr; (log qr)2) and industry dummies. Table 8 provides the means of the
estimated coe¢ cients from these logistic regressions of the probability of an actual merger
on the Kronecker Products of (log k, (log k)2, log ) and industry dummies. In Tables 7
and 8, all the estimates of log k are positive and that of (log k)2 are negative, and almost
all are statistically signicant. This nding strongly supports that rmsrelative size has a
nonlinear e¤ect on the propensity to merge. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, almost all the
estimated coe¢ cients of log qr are positive and those on (log qr)2 are negative, while more
than half of these estimates are statistically signicant. The last two columns in Table
7 indicate that the ratio between acquirer to target Qs also has nonlinear e¤ect on the
likelihood of the two rms being involved in a merger. In the last column of Table 8, seven
of the eleven estimated coe¢ cients of log  are positive and statistically signicant. This
19Since our model is talking about the within-industry mergers, it is necessary and important to distinguish
industries.
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suggests that the likelihood of a merger is larger when the relative potential growth between
acquirer and its target is sizeable. As a result, these two tables also provide empirical
support that our nonlinear Q theory on M&A is robust to disaggregation by sector.
Conclusion
The key assumptions in our model are that a rms capital is rm specic and
a cost is needed to convert targets capital into a form usable by the acquirer. We show
that mergers present a pattern in which high buys lower yet not the lowestin terms of Q;
but high buys lowin terms of the rmsgrowth potentials. Therefore, the relative growth
potential of a prospective merger pair is more suitable to explain whether they merge than
the ratio of the bidder to targets Q. From our model, we document the following ndings
about technology and the propensity to merge: (1) The distance between acquirer and its
target Qs has an inverted U-shaped e¤ect on the probability of the two rms being involved
in a merger. This means the acquirer may not purchase the lowest Q rm that it can nd,
but rather a rm with a lower Q: (2) The likelihood of a merger is positively and linearly
related to the relative growth potentials of the acquirer and its target. This means that the
likelihood of a merger is larger when the relative potential growth between acquirer and its
target is high.
Using data for mergers among US rms available from the Securities Data Cor-
poration from 1986 to 2005, we construct a series of quasi-bootstrap logistic regressions
of the probability of an actual merger on the ratio of bidder to target Qs, the two rms
size di¤erential, their relative adoptability of a new technology, and other controls. The
empirical evidence supports the main implications of the model.
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There are four possible extensions. One might be to construct more accurate
measurements of Q than current proxies in the literature, which might in turn lead to more
accurate estimates of their e¤ects on mergers.20 The second one would be to expand the
empirics to consider international and cross-border merger activity. Third, to get more
e¢ cient estimator, we better set the weight matrix in Section 4 as the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimates from the logistic regressions. It might also improve the empirical
results, if we use the non-parametric method to estimate the e¤ects of qr and  on the
likelihood of mergers, since this method has no problem to deal with the huge unbalance
between actual mergers and pseudo-mergers.
20The accuracy of measures of Q has been discussed in Erickson and Whited (2000, 2006), in which they
argue that most proxies for Q are poor.
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Table 7. SUR logistic regressions on the Kronecker Products of
(log k,(log k)2; log qr;(log qr)2) and industry dummies
Industry Name logk (logk)2 logqr (logqr)2
(1)Consumer nondurables 0.627 -0.102 0.361 -0.329
(0.012) (0.003) (0.025) (0.022)
(2)Consumer durables 0.693 -0.164 0.645 0.164
(7.334) (2.431) (12.931) (10.920)
(3)Manufacturing 0.575 -0.094 0.265 -0.064
(0.010) (0.003) (0.019) (0.016)
(4)Energy 0.917 -0.174 0.271 -0.568
(0.184) (0.035) (0.258) (0.232)
(5)Chemicals 0.572 -0.075 0.499 -0.536
(1.484) (0.292) (0.834) (1.103)
(6)Computers,software,etc. 0.452 -0.034 0.390 -0.259
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
(7)Telephone and TV 0.543 -0.072 -0.072 -0.300
(0.013) (0.003) (0.024) (0.025)
(8)Utilities 0.504 -0.089 1.342 -0.543
(0.021) (0.007) (0.119) (0.398)
(9)Wholesale 0.519 -0.069 0.513 -0.347
(0.010) (0.003) (0.021) (0.017)
(11)Finance 0.574 -0.082 0.435 -0.866
(0.006) (0.001) (0.015) (0.022)
(12)Everything else 0.562 -0.083 0.492 -0.364
(0.010) (0.003) (0.018) (0.017)
Bootstrap 100 100 100 100
Note: The mean of the 100 constants is -7.963 with one percent statistically signicant and the
standard deviation is 0.003. The reported estimators are the mean of the 100 times regressions of
each coe¢ cient. The standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent
statistical signicance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 8. SUR logistic regressions on the Kronecker Products of (log k, (log k)2; log ) and
industry dummies
Industry Name logk (logk)2 log
(1)Consumer nondurables 0.631 -0.105 0.121
(0.012) (0.003) (0.014)
(2)Consumer durables 0.616 -0.155 0.785
(6.402) (3.799) (39.221)
(3)Manufacturing 0.598 -0.095 0.135
(0.010) (0.003) (0.014)
(4)Energy 0.892 -0.173 0.004
(0.026) (0.009) (0.025)
(5)Chemicals 0.551 -0.078 0.094
(0.069) (0.014) (0.048)
(6)Computers,software,etc. 0.434 -0.037 0.144
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
(7)Telephone and TV 0.528 -0.073 0.075
(0.012) (0.003) (0.014)
(8)Utilities 0.560 -0.090 -0.175
(0.025) (0.008) (0.039)
(9)Wholesale 0.527 -0.081 0.262
(0.010) (0.003) (0.011)
(11)Finance 0.589 -0.085 -0.129
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
(12)Everything else 0.558 -0.094 0.113
(0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
Bootstrap 100 100 100
Note: The mean of the 100 constants is -8.063 with one percent statistically signicant and
the quasi bootstrap standard error is 0.003. The reported estimators are the mean of the 100 times
regressions of each coe¢ cent. The quasi standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ** and
*** represent statistical signicance at the 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively.
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CHAPTER III
A SIMULATION-BASED METHOD FOR RARE EVENTS DATA
Introduction
Over the years a considerable number of empirical investigations of Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A) have been carried out. Various types of statistical methods have been
used, ranging from fairly ad hoc applications of regression analysis to more sophisticated
variants of discriminant or probit/logit analysis. However, most of the methods may not
provide unbiased estimates for the probability of two rms being involved in a merger.
This bias is due to the data structure, which contains binary dependent variables with
dozens to thousands of times fewer ones (merger pairs) than zeros (nonmerger pairs). In
my second chapter, for example, I collect 1,317 actual within-industry merger pairs but
construct more than 3 million nonmerger pairs. This kind of data is termed rare events
data, and the di¢ culties in explaining it as well as predicting it have already been discussed
in the literature. The problems in the statistical analysis of rare events data are reviewed
and a new simulation-based method is provided in this paper.
It has been documented that there are three problems for explaining and predict-
ing rare events. First, the probability of rare events can be sharply underestimated by
most popular statistical procedures, such as probit and logit regressions. Furthermore, the
commonly used data collection strategies are far more e¢ cient. In addition, even when
all observations and necessary variables are collected, it is sometimes di¢ cult for the the
probit and logit regression to reach convergent results. Detailed explanations for the three
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problems are discussed in the following paragraphs.
First of all, the statistical properties of the regressions for the binary dependent
variable models are not invariant to the (unconditional) mean of the dependent variable.
In the binary dependent variable models, the mean of the dependent variable is the relative
frequency of events in the data, which, in addition to the number of observations, constitutes
the information content of the data set.
For the rare events data, a "matched-pairs" design has been often used, resulting
in a sample proportion of merger pairs of 0.50. This type of sampling typically implies that
the proportion of merger pairs in the sample is much larger than the proportion of such
pairs in the population of all actually merged and pseudo merged pairs. In a word, the
"matched-pairs" design causes a "choice-based sample bias" of the coe¢ cients in estimated
standard probit/logit models, in turn meaning that the probabilities being assessed in such
models are more or less biased. Usually the merger probability will be underestimated, and
hence the nonmerger probability will be overestimated.
Figure 5. The densities of Y=1 and Y=0 separately.
To explain intuitively why the probability of rare events will be misestimated, King
and Zeng (2001) provide a simplied case with one explanatory variable illustrated in Figure
5, where X denotes the explanatory variable and Y represents the dependent variable. This
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gure draws the densities of Y=1 and Y=0 separately, where the observations are arrayed
horizontally according to the value of X. Here, Y=1 means that two selected rms are
merged, and Y=0 indicates that they are not involved in a merger. In gure 5, the left
dotted curve demonstrates the distribution of Y=0 and the right solid one exhibits the
distribution of Y=1. In their example, King and Zeng assume that there are only ve
observations of Y=1, which are displayed by the short vertical lines. They argue that the
dotted density curve can be estimated essentially without error because of the large number
observations of Y=0, but any estimate of the solid density curve from the mere ve data
points will be very poor, and the estimate of the density of Y=1 will be systematically
biased toward tails. The cutting point, which maximally distinguishes the zeros and ones,
will be too far to the right since no information exists about the left end of the solid density.
As a result, Pr(Y=1) will be underestimated and then Pr(Y=0) will be overestimated.
In addition, data collection causes another di¢ culty in analyzing rare events.
There is a trade-o¤ between gathering more observations and including better or additional
variables when resources are limited. King and Zeng (2001) mention that approximately
99% of the costs in the data collection can be used to add new variables to an existing
collection. For fear of null observation of rare events, some researchers usually choose very
large numbers of observations with few, and in most cases poorly measured, explanatory
variables, which turns out ine¢ cient data collection strategies. Because it is believed that
the real information in the data lies much more with the ones than the zeros, the strategies
to have more observations have been criticized for spending time in analyzing very crude
measures on many observations almost all of which contain no relevant information. To
address the controversy in selecting the dependent variable, some advice has been given in
King and Zeng (2001). For choosing the ones, it is best to collect all available observations.
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For choosing the zeros, it depends on the cost: If it is costless to collect the zeros, the
researcher should collect as many as he or she can. If it is not costless but not more expen-
sive than in collecting the ones, the researcher should collect two to ve times more zeros
than ones. This sampling method is known in econometrics as choice-based or endogenous
stratied sampling.
Besides, there may still have management and estimation issue when all observa-
tions and necessary variables are collected. In my second chapter, for example, there are
1,317 actual within-industry mergers and more than 3 million nonmergers. Data sets of this
size are not uncommon, but they make data management di¢ cult and statistical analyses
time consuming. This outcome has already been shown in my second chapter. After pooling
all actual and pseudo mergers and running a probit or logit regression to analyze the M&A
activities, however, convergent results cannot be reached numerically by using the built-in
program in STATA or SAS1.
To provide a consistent and e¢ cient estimate for the probability of rare events,
several methods have already been constructed in the literature. The rst one is prior cor-
rection, which involves computing the usual logit regression maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) and correcting the estimates based on prior information about the fraction of ones
in the population and the observed fraction of ones in the sample. It is easy to use, but
requires knowledge of the fraction of ones in the population, which may not be available
in some cases. Another disadvantage of prior correction is that if the model is misspec-
ied, the estimates will be biased. The last but not the least issue of prior correction is
how to randomly select the zeros. The second method is the weighted exogenous sampling
maximum-likelihood method, which is proposed by Xie and Manski (1989). The essential
1To get a convergent result, this kind of data need more iteration times than those set in the logistic and
probit program in STATA and SAS.
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component of this method is to weight the data to compensate for di¤erences in the sample
and population fractions of ones induced by choice-based sampling. However, it is very
di¢ cult to apply, since it requires specialized software for estimation. Combining the above
two methods, King and Zeng (2001) build a corrected version of weighting with rare event
corrections.
Given that the underlying distribution of the dependent variable is logistic, this
paper proposes a new simulation-based econometric method to estimate the probability
of a merger, which increases the e¢ ciency of prior correction. We randomly select the
"nonevents" (pseudo merger pairs) to match the events (mergers) and apply the logit re-
gression, and then repeat the procedure a thousand times. We also construct the variance
and covariance matrix of the estimates and identify their limiting distributions, and com-
pare the e¢ ciency of our method with Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2007), who adopt the
"matched-pairs" design.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
choice-based sample probability bias. In section 3, we present a simulation-based method
for the rare events data, and analyze the e¢ ciency and the asymptotic properties of the
estimates from this method. Section 4 concludes our analysis.
The Choice-Based Sample Probability Bias
The Relation between the Sample-Based and Population-Based Merger
Probability
From Compustat and the Securities Data Corporation databases, we collect the
companiesname and their accounting information, and also identify which two rms have
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been merged in a given year. If two rms in the same industry have not been involved in a
merger in a given year, they may have the propensity to merge. In this sense, we take them
as a potential merger pair. However, in this setting, the number of actual merger pairs is
very small relative to the number of potential mergers. In the empirical work, we expect to
identify the factors that could a¤ect two rmspropensity to merge. After pooling all actual
and pseudo mergers, we can not reach a convergent result numerically by using probit and
logistic regressions.
One way to get convergent results numerically is to reduce the number of pseudo
merger pairs. However, if the statistical methods have not been adjusted in this context,
the estimated coe¢ cients should have been arbitrarily a¤ected by the chosen sample com-
positions. That means, the expected probability of two rms to be merged based on the
exogenous stratied sample strongly di¤ers from the corresponding probability in the whole
population.
In order to analyze the chioce-based sample bias, the following notation is intro-
duced:
fY g = set of dependent variables from the whole population, which is dummy
variables. Y = 1 means that the selected two rms are merged, and Y = 0 means that the
selected two rms are not merged.
fyg = set of dependent variables from the selected sample, which is dummy vari-
ables. y = 1 means that the selected two rms are merged, and y = 0 means that the
selected two rms are not merged.
fXg = set of independent variables from the whole population.
fxg = set of independent variables from the selected sample.
 = P (Y = 1); proportion of merger pairs in the grand population, where 0 <
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 < 1:
P m = P (Y = 1jfXg); population-based probability of two rms involving in a
merger.
p = P (y = 1); proportion of merger pairs in the estimation sample, where 0 <
p < 1:
P^ pm = P (y = 1jfxg); unadjusted estimated probability of two rms involving in a
merger based on a selected estimation sample with a proportion of merger pairs equals to
p:
If the prediction model has been estimated with a sample proportion of merger
pairs p is the same as the population proportion of merger pairs  ; the estimated merger
probability P^ pm from the sample is an unbiased probability assessment of the corresponding
population-based probability P m. Otherwise, the calculated probability P^
p
m will no longer
be an unbiased estimate of P m, but they are correlated.
Proposition 4 If P (fXgjY = 1) = P (fxgjy = 1); and P (fXgjY = 0) = P (fxgjy =
0), the relation between the merger probability P^ pm from the sample and the corresponding
population-based probability P m can be expressed as
P^ pm =

1 +

1  p
p


1  

1  P m
P m
 1
: (III.1)
Proof. Since P (Y = 1) =  ; then P (Y = 0) = 1   :
Assuming P m > 0; the unbiased probability P

m can be unfolded according to
Bayestheorem:
P m = P (Y = 1jfXg) (III.2)
=
P (Y = 1; fXg)
P (fXg)
=
P (fXgjY = 1)P (Y = 1)
P (fXgjY = 1)P (Y = 1) + P (fXgjY = 0)P (Y = 0)
=
P (fXgjY = 1)
P (fXgjY = 1) + P (fXgjY = 0)(1  ) ;
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Similarly, we get
P^ pm =
P (fxgjy = 1)p
P (fxgjy = 1)p+ P (fxgjy = 0)(1  p) : (III.3)
Equations III.2 and III.3 can be simplied as III.4 and III.5 correspondingly.
P (fXgjY = 1)
P (fXgjY = 0) =

(P m)
 1   1
 
1   ; (III.4)
P (fxgjy = 1)
P (fxgjy = 0) =

P^ pm
 1   1 p
1  p: (III.5)
Since P (fXgjY = 1) = P (fxgjy = 1); and P (fXgjY = 0) = P (fxgjy = 0); we
have
P (fXgjY = 1)
P (fXgjY = 0) =
P (fxgjy = 1)
P (fxgjy = 0) : (III.6)
Therefore,

(P m)
 1   1
 
1   =

P^ pm
 1   1 p
1  p; (III.7)
After simplication, equation III.7 can be written as
P^ pm =

1 +

1  p
p


1  

1  P m
P m
 1
: (III.8)
From equation III.8, we can see that the sample-based probability of a merger is
not only a function of the unbiased probability P m; but also depends on the proportion of
merged pairs in the population () and the proportion of merged pairs in the sample (p).
To better understand the association between P^ pm and P m;  as well as p; we
provide the following corollaries.
Corollary 1 If and only if p =  or P m = 1; then P^
p
m = P m:
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Proof. ) When p =  ; equation III.8 is
P^ pm =

1 +

1  P m
P m
 1
= P m: (III.9)
When P m = 1; then the right side of equation III.8 is 1. That means P^
p
m = P m = 1:
( when P^ pm = P m; equation III.8 can be rewritten as
P^ pm =

1 +

1  p
p


1  

1  P m
P m
 1
; (III.10)
=
P m
P m  

1 p
p


1 

P m +

1 p
p


1 
 ;
Since P^ pm = P m; we have
P m  

1  p
p


1  

P m +

1  p
p


1  

= 1; (III.11)
Equation III.11 is equivalent to

1 

1  p
p


1  

P m = 1 

1  p
p


1  

; (III.12)
Equation III.12 holds only if p =  or P m = 1:
Therefore, P^ pm = P m, if and only if p =  or P

m = 1:
Corollary 1 indicates that the sample-based probability of a merger P^ pm will di¤er
from an unbiased estimate of the merger probability P m, when p 6=  and P m 6= 1: The
following corollary discusses the factors that a¤ect P^ pm:
Corollary 2 The sample-based probability of a merger P^ pm is positively related to the un-
biased merger probability P m and the proportion of merged pairs in the sample (p), but
negatively related to the proportion of merged pairs in the population ().
Proof. When p 6=  ; from equation III.8, we can calculate
@(P^ pm)
@(P m)
=

1 +

1  p
p


1  

1  P m
P m
 2
(P m)
 2 > 0; (III.13)
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When p =  ; we have
@(P^ pm)
@(P m)
= 1 > 0; (III.14)
Inequalities III.13 and III.14 show that P^ pm is positively associated with the unbiased merger
probability P m.
The rst order conditions of p and  on P^ pm are
@(P^ pm)
@p
=

1 +

1  p
p


1  

1  P m
P m
 2
p 2 > 0; (III.15)
@(P^ pm)
@
=  

1 +

1  p
p


1  

1  P m
P m
 2
(1  ) 2 < 0; (III.16)
Inequalities III.15 and III.16 imply that P^ pm is an increasing function in p, but a decreasing
function in  :
Equation III.8 demonstrates P^ pm as a function of P m; p and  : In a decision context,
however, one might primarily be interested in an assessment of the unbiased probability
P m; and identifying the factors, which a¤ect this probability. Though we have problem to
directly estimate P m, we can estimate P^
p
m rst, and then approximate P m through equation
III.8. We rewrite it as
P^ m =
"
1 +

1  


p
1  p
 
1  P^ pm
P^ pm
!# 1
; (III.17)
where P^ m represents an estimate of P

m:
A necessary condition for P^ m to be an unbiased estimate of P

m is that the selected
sample should be a random drawing from a sub-population of the whole sample. After
estimating P^ pm from the selected sample, we can calculate P^ m with some correction if p and
 are given.
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Prior Correction of the Estimates from Logit Model
Assume P^ pm = P (yi = 1jfxig) = P (xi); where  are the unknown parame-
ter vector (0; 
0
1)
0
; a k  1 vector. Here, 0 is the scalar constant term and 1 is a
vector with elements corresponding to the explanatory variables. The parameters can
be estimated by maximum likelihood method, where the likelihood function is formed
by assuming independence over the observations. The likelihood function is L(jy) =
ni=1 [P (xi)]
yi [1  P (xi)]1 yi : By taking logs, the log-likelihood simplies to
lnL(jy) =
X
fyi=1g
lnP (xi) +
X
fyi=0g
ln [1  P (xi)] : (III.18)
The estimate of , labeled as ^ , gives the maximum value of function III.18. As
a consequence, P^ pm = P (xi^):
According to equation III.17, we can approximate P m as a function of P^
p
m;  and p:
In most general formulation of P^ pm; the prior correction of P^ m is consistent but not necessary
feasible to apply. Fortunately, in the logit special form of P^ pm; the prior correction is not
only consistent and fully e¢ cient, but also easy to apply.
Proposition 5 In the logit model if P^ pm = 1
1+e x^
; then
P^ m =
1
1 + e
 x^+ln
h
( 1  )

p
1 p
i : (III.19)
Proof. When P^ pm = 1
1+e x^
; equation III.8 can be written as
1
1 + e x^
=
"
1 +

1  p
p


1  
 
1  P^ m
P^ m
!# 1
;
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, 1 + e x^ = 1 +

1  p
p


1  
 
1  P^ m
P^ m
!
;
, e x^ =

1  p
p


1  
 
1
P^ m
  1
!
;
, 1
P^ m
  1 =

1  


p
1  p

e x^;
, 1
P^ m
= 1 + e
 x^+ln
h
( 1  )

p
1 p
i
;
, P^ m =
1
1 + e
 x^+ln
h
( 1  )

p
1 p
i :
The above proposition implies that for the estimate of P m; parameters ^1 need
not be changed, and only the constant term ^0 should be corrected by subtracting out the
bias factor, ln
h 
1 

  p
1 p
i
. Furthermore, the estimate after correction is consistent. It
has been proved that the prior correction is identical to the conditional maximum likelihood
estimate proposed by Manski et al. (1981) and Amemiya et al. (1987) when the model is
logistic. And it is also equivalent to the generalized method of moments estimate by Imbens
(1992), Cosslett (1981a, b), and Lancaster et al. (1996a, b) when the functional form of P^ pm
is logistic and the sampling probability, E(p); is unknown2.
However, as indicated in the previous section, corrected P^ m is an unbiased estimate
of P m only when the sample of merged pairs constitutes a random drawing from the sub-
population of merged pairs and the sample of pseudo merged pairs are randomly drew from
all possible merger pairs. It will be an issue for randomly selecting the sample, especially
for rare events data, in which the binary dependent variables with dozens to thousands of
times fewer ones than zeros. This paper adopts the bootstrap method to select the sample
and construct a simulation-based method.
2See King and Zeng (2001).
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A Simulation-Based Method
Many papers, such as Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2007), have already studied
the probability of two rms being involved in a merger. Since probit and logistic regressions
may not reach convergent results numerically from all observations, Rhodes-Kropf and
Robinson (2007) adopt the "matched-pairs" design, but they do not collect their estimates.
As a result, their estimates are biased. In order to get unbiased estimates, we provide a
new econometric method, in which we randomly select the nonevents (pseudo mergers)
to match the events (mergers), and then repeat the procedure one hundred times. As a
summary, for each time selection, we match the zeros with the ones and keep all ones, since
it is believed that the real information in the data lies much more with the ones than the
zeros.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we provide a theoretical
justication to explain the e¢ ciency of our estimates. Then, we present the bootstrap tests
for the statistical signicance of each estimate in detail. Moreover, we discuss how to correct
the estimates.
E¢ ciency of the Quasi-bootstrap Logistic Regressions
Assume the set N includes all the dependent variable Yi0 = 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n0; and
the set M includes all the dependent variable Yj1 = 1; j = 1; 2; :::; n1:It is also assumed
that n0 >> n1; which means that n0 is dozens to thousands of times more than n13. And
then the fraction of ones in the population,  ; equals n1n0+n1 : Given some regressors xi; the
goal is to estimate P (Yi1 = 1j xi); as this is the full conditional distribution. We assume
that the underlying distribution of the dependent variable is logistic, P (Yi1 = 1j xi) can be
3Here, 1 represents the actual merger pairs and 0 represents the pseudo-merger pairs. Therefore, N1 =
1; 317 and N0 = 3; 054; 479:
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expressed as:
P (Yi1 = 1jxi) = 1
1 + e x
0
i
;
where  is the true parameters for the choice-based sample.
We construct a new set At; t = 1; 2; :::; T; which contains n1 observations randomly
selected with replacement from N: And then we run a logistic regression using all the
observations from At and M; t = 1; 2; :::; T . From this procedure, we can get T estimates
of ; which are
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
:
For some T  T weight matrix W > 0; let
JT () = T
0BBBBBBBBBB@
(^1   )=T
:
:
(^T   )=T
1CCCCCCCCCCA
0
W
0BBBBBBBBBB@
(^1   )=T
:
:
(^T   )=T
1CCCCCCCCCCA
(III.20)
We use the minimum distance method (MDM ) to nd an estimate, which mini-
mizes JT (): For simplicity, we setW as the identity matrix. And then the solution of  for
minimizing JT () is the mean of
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
. We dene ^ is the MDM estimate,
^ =
PT
t=1 ^t
T
: (III.21)
Since all the estimates
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
share some dependent variables M;n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
are not independent from each other. To get more e¢ cient estimate, we
better set W as the variance-covariance of f^1; ^2; :::; ^T g; which is unknown and can not
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be constructed easily. That means, the estimate ^ is not the most e¢ cient, when W is the
identity matrix. However, it still has the following asymptotic properties.
Claim 2 The asymptotic properties of ^ are:
(1) (1) ^ !p : (2)
(2) Under H0 :  = 0;
p
T (^)!d N(0; 2); where 2 is unknown. (3)
(3) ^ is more e¢ cient than the estimate from Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2007) "matched-
pairs" design probit regression.
Since 2 is unknown, we can not directly test the statistical signicance of ^:
Instead, we use the bootstrap, a simulation based method. From the bootstrap samples,
we perform bootstrap tests on the basis of bootstrap P values.
Bootstrap Tests
To obtain the bootstrap samples, we use four steps:
Step 1. Draw with replacement n1 observations from M ;
Step 2. Draw with replacement n1 observations from At; and combine them with
the sample we obtain in Step 1;
Step 3. Run logistic regressions using each combined sample from Step 2;
Step 4. Repeat Steps 1-3 B times.4
Hence, we dene set Ntb that includes n1 observations randomly drew with re-
placement from each At; and set Mtb that includes n1 observations randomly drew with
replacement from M; where t = 1; 2; :::; T and b = 1; 2; :::; B: Next, we run a logistic regres-
sion using all the observations from sets Ntb and Mtb; and denote the estimate as ^

tb:
We dene that
4According to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), if we will perform a bootstrap test at level ; then B
should be choosen to satisfy the condition that (B + 1) is an integer.
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^

b =
PT
t=1 ^

tb
T
; b = 1; 2; :::; B; (III.22)
which is constructed in the same way as that of ^. And then the standard deviation ofn
^

b ; b = 1; 2; :::; B
o
will be the standard error of our quasi bootstrap estimates, which is
called quasi bootstrap standard error in this paper. Since the mean of ^

b is ^ and the null
hypothesis H0 is  = 0, we take ^

b   ^ as the simulated test statistics. There are two cases
to construct the empirical distribution function (EDF) based on the one-sided test.
If the alternative hypothesis H1 is  > 0; then the EDF is
F^ (^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^  ^): (III.23)
Our estimate of the true P value for this case is therefore
p^(^) = 1  F^ (^) = 1  1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^ < ^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b > 2^): (III.24)
The last equality in equation III.24 means that the true P value is approximated by the
proportion of simulations, in which ^

b is greater than 2^: For example, if B = 599; and 25
of all the ^

b are greater than 2^; then p^
(^) = 25=599 = 0:042: As a result in this example,
we would reject the null hypothesis that  = 0 at 5 percent statistic signicant level.
If the alternative hypothesis H1 is  < 0; then the EDF is
F^ (^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^  ^): (III.25)
Our estimate of the true P value is
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p^(^) = 1  F^ (^) = 1  1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b   ^  ^) =
1
B
BX
b=1
I(^

b < 2^): (III.26)
If B is innitely large, the EDF converges to the true conditional distribution
function (CDF). Consequently, our procedure would yield an exact test and the outcome of
the test would be the same as the P value computed by using the conditional distribution
function (CDF) of ^.
Correction for the Estimates
Though a bootstrap has been adopted in the above method, it is still a "matched-
pairs" design, which results in a sample proportion of merged pairs of 0.50. This type of
sampling typically implies that the proportion of merged pairs in the sample is much larger
than the proportion of such pairs in the grant population of all pairs (merged and non-
merged). This design causes a "choice-based sample bias" of the constant and the coe¢ cients
in the standard logit models, in turn meaning that the probabilities being assessed in such
models are more or less biased. Hence, we provide the correction for the estimates from the
above quasi bootstrap logistic regression.
Since we know the fraction of ones in the population,  , which equals n1n0+n1 ; we
can use the prior correction for the logit model. For each logistic regression above, the
constant item ^

t0 should be corrected by subtracting out the bias factor; ln
 
1 


; and
other parameters are statistically consistent5. The nal corrected estimate ^
c
1 is the same
as ^1 and the nal corrected estimate ^
c
0 for the constant item ^0 is
5Here, y = 1=2; so y
1 y = 1:
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^0   ln

1  


; (III.27)
because ^1 =
PT
t=1 ^

t1
T and ^0 =
PT
t=1 ^

t0
T : Subsequently, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The corrected estimate

^
c
0; ^
c
1

has the same asymptotic properties as ^:
Conclusion
This paper reviews three problems in explaining and predicting rare events data.
First, the probability of rare events can be sharply underestimated by most popular sta-
tistical procedures, such as probit and logit regressions. In addition, the commonly used
data collection strategies are far more e¢ cient. Further, even when collecting all observa-
tions and necessary variables, the logistic and probit regressions may sometimes not reach
numerically to a convergent result.
Although there are some problems for estimating rare events data, several methods
have been constructed to provide consistent estimates under some conditions, such as the
prior correction, weighting, and the corrected version of weighting with rare event correc-
tions. In addition, this paper contributes a new simulation-based econometric method to
the literature. The method adopts bootstrap to select the data. The procedure goes as the
following. First, we randomly select the "nonevents" (pseudo merger pairs) to match the
events (mergers) and run a logistic regression, and then repeat this procedure hundreds of
times. We also construct the bootstrap standard errors and p values of the estimates.
In this paper, we set the identity matrix as the weighted matrix to estimate the
parameters with the minimum distance method. With this setting, the simulation-based
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method bring consistent but not the most e¢ cient estimates, since all the intermediate
estimates
n
^t; t = 1; 2; :::; T
o
from each logistic regression share some dependent variables
M and then independent from each other. To get more e¢ cient estimates, however, we
better set the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates f^1; ^2; :::; ^T g from the logistic
regressions as the weighted matrix, which we would like to explore further in the future.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY DIFFERENCES AND INCOME INEQUALITY:
EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-COUNTRY HISTORICAL DATA
Introduction
Today, we live in a world with signicant di¤erences in living standards and pro-
duction across countries. According to the Penn World Table project conducted by Robert
Summers and Alan Heston, the richest countries such as the United States and Switzerland
are about thirty times richer than the poorest countries in Africa and South Asia. Pro-
duction per person in the wealthiest economy is thirty times more per person than in the
poorest economy. Why are some economies so much richer than others? What accounts for
sustained economic growth in these countries? Although there are a few di¤erent voices,
most economists agree that the most important driver of economic growth is progress in
technology. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) as well as Hall and Jones (1999) show that
di¤erences in total factor productivity (TFP) account for a majority of the gap in income
per capita between rich and poor countries. Prescott (1998) argues that di¤erences in phys-
ical or human capital are not, in themselves, su¢ cient to account for the large international
income di¤erences. He emphasizes the need for developing a theory of TFP. "To account
for sustained growth," Robert E. Lucas Jr. has written in the 2003 Annual Report of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, "the modern theory needs to postulate continuous
improvement in technology or in knowledge ..." In focusing on this area of the literature,
we reexamine these fundamental questions by analyzing the relation between cross-country
technology di¤erences and income inequity.
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A number of researchers have devoted much e¤ort to proposing answers to the
question: What are the determinants of cross-country disparities in technology? Most
macroeconomists use the vintage capital models to understand the adoption of new tech-
nologies, such as Johansen (1959), Solow (1960), Gilchrist and Williams (2001) and Laitner
and Stolyarov (2002). However, most vintage capital models assume that rms or coun-
tries invest only in frontier technology and the old vintages decrease because of depreciation,
which violates the fact that investment in non-frontier technologies is an important empirical
reality in cross-country technological adoption. Vintage human capital theory explains the
technology adoption delays only for those technologies that are associated with technology-
specic skills, such as Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Brezis et al. (1993), Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1996) and Jovanovic (2006b). Jones (1994) argues that di¤erent policies result in
di¤erent technologies across countries. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Eeckhout and
Jovanovic (2002) provide imitator-innovator models to explain the fact that leaders tend to
innovate and to be the rst to adopt new technologies while the lagging countries mostly
imitate. Parente and Prescott (1999) argue that poor countries cannot adopt better tech-
nologies because of monopoly rights that are protected via regulation. The poor country
uses ine¢ cient technology, and therefore, remains poor. Basu and Weil (1999) introduce an
appropriate technology model, in which new technologies can only be implemented success-
fully by countries with the appropriate endowments. Khan and Ravikumar (2002) develop
a model of technology adoption incorporating an irrecoverable and xed cost. They show
that there is a unique threshold level of wealth, which depends on technology parameters.
If a country is richer than the threshold, it will adopt the new technology, otherwise it
will retain the outdated technologies. Comin and Hobijn (2003) show that a countrys hu-
man capital endowment, type of government, degree of openness to trade, and adoption of
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predecessor technologies are the most important determinants of the technology adoption
speed. Antras (2005) argues that goods are initially manufactured in the country where
they are rst introduced because of contractual frictions, and then shifted to a low-wage
foreign location when they become su¢ ciently standardized and need less management.
Some researchers focus on technology adoption and inequality. Matsuyama (2002)
shows that income inequality induces technological adoption lags between rich and poor
countries. He argues that each new product is bought rst by the rich and then by the
poor, and the di¤usion lags are determined by income dispersion. Rogers (2003) concludes
that the consequences of the di¤usion of innovations usually widen the socio-economic gap
between the earlier and later adopting categories in a system. Jovanovic (2006) states that a
new technology adoption will rst slow down economic growth and then speed it up. Lahiri
and Ratnasiri (2007) use a dynamic general equilibrium model with household specic costs
of technology adoption to catch the negative correlation between the degree of technology
adoption and income inequality within countries.
However, most of the literature is short of measurement, which can capture the
extensive and intensive margin of the technological adoptions, and then may only explain
some specic anecdotes about the cross-country technology adoption patterns rather than
general facts. It is therefore worthwhile to dig out the adoption processes and their rela-
tion to cross-country income inequality, which occur for most major technologies and most
countries.
This paper re-investigates the Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology
data set (CHAT) introduced by Comin and Hobijn (2006). This dataset covers about 110
technologies in over 150 countries over the last 200 years. Comin and Hobijn (2006) have
summarized ve facts about the historical technology usage: (1) Once the intensive margin
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is measured, technologies do not di¤use in a logistic way. (2) Within a typical technology,
the dispersion in the adoption levels across countries is about 5 times larger than the cross-
country dispersion in income per capita. (3) The rankings of countries by level of technology
adoption are very highly correlated across technologies. (4) Within a typical technology,
there has been convergence at an average rate of 4 percent per year. (5) The convergence
rates of the technologies developed since 1925 have been almost three times higher than
those of the technologies developed before 1925.
In this paper, we focus on the relation between technological adoptions and income
dispersion across countries. We follow the example of the convergence of income per capita
literature and estimate measures of absolute -convergence. We also study the kernel joint
density estimate of income and each technology, and test that most of the estimates are
multimodal by means of the graphical technique of Signicance in Scale Space, a visualiza-
tion method based on the gradient direction. Besides these ndings from Comin and Hobijn
(2006), we explore CHAT further and document the following facts:
(i) Though DCs always adopt a new technology earlier than LDCs do, the conver-
gence speed of technology adoption across LDCs is faster than that across DCs after this
technology is also adopted by LDCs.
(ii) Most technological adoptions among poorer economies cluster in a lower level
than those among richer economies.
(iii) The convergence speed of each technology adoption is non-monotone over time
rather than accelerating.
(iv) Computer and internet invention have not increased the convergence speed of
other technologies adoption across all countries, across DCs or across LDCs.
(v) The relation between the convergence speed of technology adoption and that
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of per capita income is negative across all countries and across LDCs, but is positive across
DCs from the period 1946 - 1972 to the period 1973-2000.
(vi) The dispersion in technology adoption for individual technologies is 3 - 5 times
larger than the dispersion in income per capita both across DCs and LDCs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
the CHAT data set. In section 3, we present the empirical evidence. Our conclusions are
presented in section 4.
Data
This paper reanalyzes the Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology (CHAT)
data set, introduced by Comin and Hobijn (2006). This data set is an unbalanced panel,
which contains historical information on the adoption of about 110 technologies in the past
200 years across over 150 countries. The technologies in the data set can be classied into
nine groups: (1) Agriculture, (2) Finance, (3) Health, (4) Steel, (5) Telecommunication, (6)
Textiles, (7) Tourism, (8) Transportation, and (9) General technologies.1 CHAT also has
the records of these countriespopulation from 1750 to 2000 and real GDP from 1820 to
2000 that is measured in million of 1990 international Stone-Geary dollars.
To capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of di¤usion, we follow the
measurement introduced by Comin and Hobijn (2003) to approximate the level of technology
adoption. There are ve di¤erent proxies. First, some technologies are measured as share of
output produced by various production technologies, such as percent of irrigated land out of
cultivated land in agriculture, percent of children aged 12 - 23 months who received a measles
immunization before the age of one year in health, percent of steel produced by the acid
1The general technologies include three technologies, namely electricity production, the number of com-
puters and the number of internet users.
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Bessemer method and so on. Second, technologies in textiles and shipping are measured as
capital share, which means a technology is approximated by the fraction of capital stock to
be made up of equipment that embodies a particular technology. Third, we use production
to real GDP to measure some production technologies for which CHAT does not have capital
stock data but only data on output produced. We have four technologies measured in this
way: civil aviation ton-KM of cargo carried on scheduled services by companies registered in
the country concerned, ton-KM of freight carried on railways, metric tons of freight carried
on railways and geographical length of line open at the end of the year. The forth proxy, for
passenger cars, mobile phones, ATMs and so on, is dened as capital stocks per capita. The
last but not the least measure is consumption per capita used for mail, telegrams, cheques
issued, debit and credit card transactions as well as passenger transportation variables. The
ve proxies can be classied into three groups: on per capita basis, on unit real GDP basis,
and the share of output produced with the technique. Technology variables description and
their measurements are listed in Tables 9 - 11.
Empirical Evidence
Following the literature about the convergence of income per capita, we estimate
the measures of absolute -convergence. We estimate the speed of -convergence of technol-
ogy i by running the following regression for technologies measured in log-per-capita terms
or in log-unit-real-GDP terms:
lnYij;t   lnYij;t 1 = + cj   (1  e i) lnYij;t 1 + uij;t; (IV.1)
For technologies measured as shares, we estimate -convergence from:
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yij;t   yij;t 1 = + cj   (1  e i)yij;t 1 + uij;t; (IV.2)
where  is constant, cj is country j xed e¤ect, and uij;t is the residual.
Following equation IV.1, we estimate s across all countries, across developed
countries (DCs) as well as across developing countries (LDCs) for these technologies mea-
sured in log-per capita or log-unit-real-GDP terms over all available time.2 The results
are reported in Tables 12 - 14.3 It indicates that, among the 92 technologies, 22 of them
experience convergence rates 0 - 0.5 times faster across LDCs than across DCs, 13 of them
experience convergence rates 0.5 - 1 times faster within LDCs than within DCs, 21 of them
have at least one time faster convergence speeds within LDCs than within DCs, 5 of them
converge within LDCs but diverge within DCs, and only 20 of them have lower convergent
speeds within LDCs. Half of the 20 technologies are from health industry and another
half includes ship_sail, TV, txtlamat_totalraw, telephone, steel_stainless, railp, railPKM,
railTKM, txtlmat_synth, and shipton_total.
Following equation IV.2, we estimate s across all countries, across DCs as well
as across LDCs for the 21 technologies measured in shares over all available time. Table
15 presents the results. Among the 21 technologies, one of them is convergent across LDCs
but divergent across DCs, 12 of them converge faster across LDCs than across DCs, only
ve of them have lower convergence speed across LDCs than across DCs, and others have
no enough information.
Fixing the physical time, we get very similar results as those from equation IV.1
and equation IV.2. Since World War I took place between 1914 and 1918, World War II
2We exclude Israel when we divide the countries into developed countries and developing countries.
3We measure steel and ship technologies both on log-per capita basis and as the share of output producted
with the technique.
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happened from 1939 to 1945, and personal computer and internet were invented on 1973, we
divide the time series into three part: 1919 - 1938, 1946 - 1972 and 1973 - 2000.4 In period
1919 - 1938, 6 percent out of the total 110 technologies have higher convergence speeds across
DCs than across LDCs, 13 percent technologies have lower convergence speeds across DCs
than across LDCs, and others do not have enough observations. In period 1946 - 1972,
there are 9 percent technologies having higher convergence speeds across DCs than across
LDCs, and 19 percent technologies with higher convergence speeds across LDCs than across
DCs. In period 1973 - 2003, only 16 percent technologies that DCs have higher convergence
speed than LDCs do, but 48 percent technologies that DCs have lower convergence speed
than LDCs, and 4 percent technologies diverge in DCs but converge in LDCs.
One may argue that LDCs adopt lower quality technologies, and then have lower
cost than DCs. Consequently, it takes less time for LDCs converging to their equilibrium
than DCs. However, there are some technologies experiencing higher convergence speed
across LDCs than across DCs, such as credit and debit card transactions as well as steel
produced by electric arc furnaces, the measure of which is relatively homogenous both over
time and across countries. For some technologies, such as cars, computers and TVs, though
they are constantly reinvented and have important di¤erences in the quality of the object
measured over time and across countries, the measure we apply partially reects the cross-
country and time-series variation in the quality of technologies and also keep as homogenous
as possible of these variant technologies, resulting from the positive correlation between
demand and the quality of a technology moderating in part the di¤erences in quality. The
more important fact is that this kind technologies with di¤erent quality over time and across
countries are not the majority which experiences a higher convergence speed across LDCs
4We think the inventions of internet and computer are special, because after that, low-cost information,
data storage and transmission technologies are in general use, leading the way to deep changes in all elds
of life.
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than across DCs. As a result, the quality di¤erence may not be the main reason to result
a higher convergence speed in LDCs.
For robustness of the nding that technologies converge faster within LDCs than
within DCs, we run the following regression for technologies measured in log-per-capita
terms or in log-unit-real-GDP terms:
lnYij;t   lnYij;t 1 = + cj   (1  e i) lnYij;t 1 + j lnYij;t 1  dc+ uij;t; (IV.3)
while for technologies measured as shares we estimate -convergence from:
yij;t   yij;t 1 = + cj   (1  e i)yij;t 1 + jyij;t 1  dc+ uij;t; (IV.4)
where dc is a dummy. When country j belongs to developed countries, dc = 1; otherwise
dc = 0: If j > 0; then j for LDCs is larger than DCs. If j = 0; they have the same j :
Otherwise, DCs have a larger j than LDCs. During the whole time series, 59 percent of
technologies have a positive , and 63 percent out of them are signicant. While 25 percent
of technologies have a negative ; but only 28 percent out of them are signicant. We also
x the physical time. From 1919 to 1938, 13 percent of technologies have a positive , and
54 percent out of them are signicant. While 8 percent of technologies have a negative
; but only 38 percent out of them are signicant. From 1946 to 1972, 28 percent of
technologies have a positive , and 54 percent out of then are signicant. While 10 percent
of technologies have a negative ; but only 10 percent out of them are signicant. From
1973 to 2000, 59 percent of technologies have a positive , and 63 percent out of them are
signicant. While 25 percent of technologies have a negative ; but only 28 percent out of
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them are signicant. Consequently, based on these facts, we conclude our rst nding as
the following.
Fact 1: Though developed countries always adopt a new technology earlier than
developing countries, the convergence speed of technology adoption across developing coun-
tries is faster than that across developed countries after this technology is adopted by
developing countries as well.
In growth economics, -convergence has been widely used to test whether each
country converges to its own equilibrium, but does not provide much information on how
economies perform relative to each other. A process of either technology homogenization or
persistent gaps can be manifested in the shape of the joint density distribution of income
per capita and the level of each technology adoption along the time. As Bianchi (1997),
we also let the data speak for themselves through the nonparametric density estimators.
To test whether the observed features from the nonparametric joint density estimators are
"really there", we use the graphical technique of signicance in scale space, a visualization
method proposed by Godtliebsen, Marron and Chaudhuri (2002).
The kernel joint density estimate of the log of income per capita and technological
adoption at a given year can be expressed as the following:
f^h(x; y) = N
 1
NX
k=1
Kh(x Xk; y   Yk); (IV.5)
where Xk is the log of income per capita in country k at a given year, Yk is the log (or the
share) of the adoption level of technology Y in country k at a given year, k = 1; :::; N ; K is
the kernel function and h is the bandwidth. After K is taken to be a spherically symmetric
Gaussian density, equation IV.5 can be written as the following product form,
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Kh(x Xk; y   Yk) = 'hx(x Xk)'hy(y   Yk); (IV.6)
where 'hi denotes the rescaling
'hi() =
1
hi
'(

hi
); i = x or y; (IV.7)
where ' is the standard Gaussian density.
To investigate the features of the joint distribution of income per capita and tech-
nology adoptions, we use the "normal reference rule" to select the optimal bandwidth,
which minimizes the mean integrated squared errors (MISE). The optimal bandwidth can
be approximated by hi;
hi = in
 1=6; i = x or y;
where i is the standard deviation of the ith variate and can be replaced by its sample
estimator in practical implementations.5
Under these settings, we estimate the joint distribution of income per capita and
each technology. These estimates can tell us which joint density is bimodal, and in turn
tell us which technological adoption clusters in a lower level at LDCs. Because of the
"curse of the dimension", kernel density estimates may miss important structure via over-
smoothing, or may nd unimportant spurious structure via undersmoothing, though it is
a good smoothing method which can show structure in data. Even we apply the normal
5See Scott (1992), Bowman and Azzalini (1997), in which hi = if 4(d+2)ng1=(d+4); for i = 1; 2; :::; d and d
is the dimension. In our paper, d=2.
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reference rule, a data-based bandwidth selection, to select the bandwidth, we may not
get good estimates of the joint density of income and each technological adoption, because
the underlying distribution of our data may be non-Gaussian. The streamline version of
Signicance in Scale Space, which simultaneously study a very wide range of bandwidth,
avoid bandwidth selection and test whether the observed features from the kernel density
estimates are "really there". The streamlines are curves essentially indicating the gradient
direction and therefore indicating the statistically signicant structure. In others words,
these curves indicate the direction that a drop of water would follow as it moves down the
surface.
To construct these streamlines, we randomly pick up a point where the gradient is
signicant, and then end the streamlines when there is no signicant gradient in this region
or a peak/vally or a boundary is reached. The main idea is to test the signicancy of the
gradient of the kernel estimates.
Without specifying the bandwidth, as Godtliebsen et al. (2002), we bin our data
to an equally spaced rectangular grid,
f(xi; yj) : xi = Lx + ix; yj = Ly + jy; i = 0; :::; n; j = 0; :::;mg: (IV.8)
The bin is a rectangular lattice, in which xi is equally spaced over [Lx + nx] and yj is
equally spaced over [Ly +my]: Then the mapped points are counted to give a matrix C
of bin counts, whose ith; jth entry is
ci;j = ](data points assigned to bin i; j): (IV.9)
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The kernel density estimate f^h of x and y can be approximated by
~fh = N
 1(C  ~Kh); (IV.10)
where  denotes bivariate discrete convolution, and ~Kh is a matrix of evaluation of the
kernel function Kh: The partial derivatives of f^h can be approximated by
D ~fh = N
 1(C D ~Kh); (IV.11)
whereD denotes various partial derivative operators, including (@=@x); (@=@y); (@2=@x2); (@2=@x@y)
and (@2=@y2):
At a given location, the gradient of the underlying density f is
G(f) = [(fx)
2 + (fy)
2]1=2;
where fx = (@=@x)f and fy = (@=@y)f: The estimate of G(f) is
G^(f) = [( ~fh;x)
2 + ( ~fh;y)
2]1=2;
where ~fh;x and ~fh;y come from formula IV.11. The null hypothesis is
H0 : G(f) = 0:
The null distribution of this test is based on the bivariate Gaussian distribution
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0BB@ ~fh;x
~fh;y
1CCA  N
0BB@
0BB@ 0
0
1CCA ;
0BB@
2x
8h4
; 0
0;
2y
8h4
1CCA
1CCA :
Because of this Gaussian distribution, we have
( ~fh;x)
2
2x=8h
4
+
( ~fh;y)
2
2y=8h
4
 22:
That means, we will reject the null hypothesis when
( ~fh;x)
2
^21
+
( ~fh;y)
2
^22
> q22(
0); (IV.12)
where ^21 and ^
2
2 are the estimates of the sample variance
dvar[Df^h(x; y)] = 1
N   1
(
N 1
NX
k=1
(DKh(x Xk; y   Yk))2  

D ~fh(x; y)
2)
: (IV.13)
A new binned approximation for the rst term inside the braces of the expression of
dvar[Df^h(x; y)] is
N 1
n
C  [(D ~Kh)2]
o
:
In equation IV.12, 0 is the signicance level for condence intervals, which cover the e¤ec-
tive independent points of each bin at a desired overall signicance level :6 The relation
between 0 and  is
6In the empirical work , we set  = 0:05:
71
 = Pfkth condence interval not covering, k = 1; :::; lg
= 1  Pfcondence interval coversgl
= 1  (1  0)l;
where l is the average number of the e¤ective independent data points. According to "kernel
weighted count" of the number of points in each bin, the e¤ect sample size l in each bin is
dened as
l =
Xn
i=1
Xm
j=1
ESSi;j =
Xn
i=1
Xm
j=1
PN
k=1Kh(xi  Xk; yj   Yk)
Kh(0; 0)

Xn
i=1
Xm
j=1
C  ~Kh
Kh(0; 0)
;
where ESS stands for e¤ect sample size for each point.
After introducing the theories, we put them with the data. Since we will test that
technological adoptions among poorer economies cluster in a lower level than that among
richer economies, we only investigate these technologies that have observations in at least 65
countries in some years. Totally 32 technologies satisfy our conditions, out of which 24 are
measured on per capita, 4 are measured in share, and the last 4 are measured in unit real
GDP. To save space, we only present the kernel density estimates and their corresponding
contour plots of the electricity production and income at year 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990
and 2000 in gure 6. From the kernel density estimates in gure 6, we can see that except
in year 1950, the joint density of income and electricity production is multi-modal. From
the contour plots, we can see that all the data are along the 45 degree line. It seems the
LDCselectricity production cluster in a lower level than that of DCs.
To test whether the LDCs experience a lower electricity production level, we draw
the streamlines for each kernel density estimate. To save space again, only 4 scales, i.e.
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bandwidth, are shown in gures 7 - 12, in which we present h=5, 5.3, 5.6, and 6.7 In these
gures, gray level images are shown, which are adjusted for maximum contrast. That is,
the color white is used for all regions where the density is higher than 20% of its maximum
and the color black is used for the minimum. The green "streamlines" indicate the gradient
direction and therefore the structure of a surface. The purple lines are contour lines, which
are orthogonal to the green ones. Statistical signicant cluster will be highlighted by a
purple circle surrounding it, because it will be a hill of high density (light gray). In these
gures, the gray regions are around the 45 degree line, which means richer countries have
higher electricity production. According to the light gray region, streamlines and purple
lines show that the joint densities of income and electricity production are bimodal for year
1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, but not for year 1950 and 1960. Although Streamlines and
purple lines will give us strong evidence of presence of a feature, lack of streamlines and
purples only indicates the evidence is not strong and does not prove absence of a cluster.
Subsequently, we can not tell whether the bimodal structure is really not there at year 1950
and 1960.
Though we do not present every kernel density estimate of each technology in this
paper, we summarize the result in Tables 16 - 18.8 Tables 16 and 17 shows that 18 out of
24 technologies measured in per capita basis have multi-modal joint density with income
per capita. In Table 18, 3 out of 4 technologies measured in unit real GDP and 1 out of
4 technologies measured in share have multi-modal joint densities with income per capita.
This observation implies that technological adoptions in poor countries may converge to a
lower level than that in rich countries, which is consistent with club convergencetheory
in growth economics. The club convergence theory says that developing countries dis-
7The full scale space can be shown in a movie, which is available upon request.
8Each kernel density estimate is available upon request.
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play faster growth rates in terms of -convergence but can not catch up with developed
economies, such as Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Quah (1996a, b).
Based on our kernel density estimates and the streamline version of Signicance
in Scale Space, we conclude the following fact:
Fact 2: Most technological adoptions among developing economies cluster in a
lower level than those among developed economies.
Comin and Hobijn (2006) document a fact that the speed of technological con-
vergence across countries has accelerated over time. They also document that across all
countries, the median speed of convergence for technologies invented before 1925 is 2 per-
cent per year, that for technologies invented between 1925 and 1950 is 5.5 percent per year,
and that for technologies invented since 1950 is about 6 percent per year. Besides, from
Tables 12 - 15, we observe that some technologies invented in 1960s have very high conver-
gence speeds, which result in a high median speed of convergence for technologies invented
since 1950: the convergence speeds for transplant_lung invented in 1963, pctimmunizmeas
invented in 1964, med_mammograph invented in 1966, transplant_liver invented 1967,
transplant_heart invented in 1967, and atm invented 1967 correspondingly are 11.8 per-
cent, 11.9 percent, 10.4 percent, 11.2 percent, 9.3 percent and 14.8 percent. There are
some technologies invented after 1950 having very low convergence rate. For example, the
convergence speeds of eft invented in 1979 and med_lithotriptor invented in 1980 are only
2 percent. From these tables, we also observe that technologies invented after 1973 have
lower  than those invented in 1960s.
Looking at the technological adoption convergence speed across LDCs and DCs
separately in Tables 12 - 15, we observe that across DCs the median speed of convergence
for technologies invented before 1925 is 2.4 percent per year, that for technologies invented
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between 1925 and 1950 is 8.5 percent per year and that for technologies invented since 1950
is about 6.6 percent per year. Across LDCs the median speed of convergence for technologies
invented before 1925 is 4.4 percent per year, that for technologies invented between 1925
and 1950 is 11.4 percent per year and that for technologies invented since 1950 is about 9.5
percent per year. The observations do not support the Comin and Hobijns argument that
the speed of convergence of technology across countries has accelerated over time.
Tables 19 -21 report the s in 1919 - 1938, 1946 - 1972 and 1973 - 2000 across all
countries estimated according to equations IV.1 and IV.2. From period 1919 - 1938 to period
1946 - 1972, among 110 technologies shown in this table, 16 technologiesconvergence rates
decrease but only 4 technologiesconvergence rates increase, and from period 1946 - 1972 to
period 1973 - 2000, 19 technologies decrease but 15 technologies increase. On average,
the convergence speed of technologies adoption in period 1919-1938 across all countries is
0.111, that in period 1946 - 1972 is 0.137 and that in period 1973-2000 is 0.115, which are
presented in Table 22. Table 22 also reports the s across DCs and across LDCs in the
three periods. We nd the s are increasing from period 1919-1938 to period 1946-1972,
but decline from period 1946-1972 to 1973-2000.
The change of the cost to adopt a new technology may contribute to the non-
monotone change of technological adoption convergence rate among these three periods.
The cost of technological adoptions decrease in 1940s but increase in 1970s, which has the
opposite trend as the change of technological adoption convergence rates.
Schmookler (1954) document that the patent-invention ratio fell after 1940, which
implies a lower cost of adopting technologies. There are two reasons for the fall of patent-
invention ratio: (1) As science and technology grew in complexity, the sheer intellectual
di¢ culty of advancing beyond the existing boundaries probably increased. (2) The rise in
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the size of the average rm and the growth of scientic management probably increased the
relative attention devoted to unpatentable small improvements.
The Patent Cooperation Treaty concluded in 1970 which covers 137 countries and
the European Patent Convention to be e¤ective in 1973 result the rising of the cost to adopt
a new technology innovated by other countries after 1970s. The transition to information
technology in the middle of 1970s cause the adjustment costs more than doubled, which is
found by Bessen (2001).
From our exploration of the cross-country technology adoption, we can summarize
our third nding as the following.
Fact 3: The convergence speed of each technology adoption is non-monotone along
the time series.
After the inventions of internet and computer, low-cost information, data storage
and transmission technologies are in general use, leading the way to deep changes in all
elds of life. The Solows paradox that "we can see the computer age everywhere except
in the productivity statistics" is still a puzzle to economists. Gordon (2000) summarizes ve
reasons to explain why the internet has not had a signicant e¤ect on productivity growth
outside of durable manufacturing. First, since consumer time is limited, the internet use
only substitutes for other forms of entertainment and information gathering. Second, much
investment in Internet web sites and infrastructure competes for market share by redis-
tributing sales rather than creating them. Third, internet provides preexisting information
cheaply and conveniently rather than creates truly new products and activities. Fourth,
much web site development duplicates existing forms of commerce and information which
results higher costs. Fifth, a large fraction of consumption activity on the web takes place
at the o¢ ce, which decreases the e¢ ciency of working. Another reason, not mentioned in
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Gordon (2000), is the limited human being who grasp the knowledge to use PC and internet.
For PC use and Internet access, a more di¤erentiated and complex set of skills is required.
However, the Eurobarometer survey on "ICT and work" indicates that most workers have
no formal qualications and many have had no training. The number of ICT trained work-
ers is still limited and relative human capital does not have a signicant increase after the
invention of Computer and Internet.
Our regression results indicate that computer and internet invention have not
increased the convergence speeds of other technologies invented after 1973, which are con-
sistent with Solows paradox. Across all countries, the convergence speeds for eft invented
on 1979, for med_lithotriptor invented on 1980, for surg_corstent invented on 1980 and
for med_mriunit invented on 1981 are 2 percent, 2 percent, 5.9 percent and 5.4 percent
separately, some of which are even lower than the s for technologies invented before 1925.
Across DCs, the convergence speeds for eft invented on 1979, for med_lithotriptor invented
on 1980, for surg_corstent invented on 1980 and for med_mriunit invented on 1981 are 6.9
percent, 12 .9 percent, 12 percent and 5.8 percent separately. Across LDCs, the convergence
speeds for eft invented on 1979, for med_lithotriptor invented on 1980 and for med_mriunit
invented on 1981 are 8.8 percent, 27.7 percent, and 5.4 percent separately.
Table 22 shows that s increase from period 1919 - 1938 to period 1946 - 1972,
but decline from period 1946 - 1972 to 1973 - 2000 across all countries, across DCs or across
LDCs. In a words, the convergence speed of each technology is not signicantly a¤ected by
the invention of computer and internet.
Therefore, we reach the following conclusion:
Fact 4: Computer and internet invention have not increased the convergence speed
of other technologies adoption across all countries, across developed countries or across
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developing countries.
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hsieh and Klenow (2003) argue that
di¤erences in technology are the main determinant of income dispersion across countries.
Rogers (2003) think that the di¤usion of innovations generally causes wider socioeconomic
gaps within an audience. One of his arguments is that by adopting innovations relatively
sooner than others in their system, innovators and early adopters achieve windfall prots,
thereby widening the socioeconomic gap between these earlier adopting categories versus
later adopting categories. Thus, the earlier adopters get richer and the later adopters
economic gain is comparatively less.
From CHAT, however, we can not observe monotone relation between technological
adoption and income growth. Across all countries and across LDCs, the convergence speed
of technology adoption and that of per capita income is negative , while across DCs, it is
negative from period 1919 - 1938 to period 1946 - 1972 and positive from period 1946 - 1972
to period 1973 - 2000. Table 7 reports the average -convergence speed of technologies and
income per capita in 1919 - 1938, 1946 - 1972 and 1973 - 2000 across all countries, DCs as
well as LDCs. Across all countries or developing countries, the -convergence of income per
capita decrease from period 1919 - 1938 to period 1946 - 1972 but increase from period 1946
- 1972 to 1973 - 2000, while the average -convergence of technologies adoption increase
from period 1919 - 1938 to period 1946 - 1972 but decrease from period 1946 - 1972 to 1973
- 2000. Across developed countries, the -convergence of income per capita decrease along
the time series, while the average -convergence of technologies adoption keep the same
trend as those across all countries and across LDCs.
Across all countries in period 1946 - 1972, the technologies that have the high-
est convergence speed are spindle_ring, txtlmat_otherraw and txtlmat_otherraw. Their
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convergence speeds are 1.26, 0.942 and 0.6 respectively. To study whether the outliers
dominate the average technological adoption convergence speed, we exclude the three tech-
nologies and recalculate the average convergence speed. After excluding them, however,
technology adoption and income across all countries still experience a non-positive relation.
Across DCs in period 1946 - 1972, the top three highest convergence speed is: that of spin-
dle_ring is 0.777, that of txtlmat_otherraw is 1.173 and that of steel_acidbess is 0.600.
Excluding the three technologies, the relation between technological adoption and income
across DCs is still non-positive. Across LDCs in period 1946 - 1972, after spindle_ring and
txtlmat_otherraw are excluded, which experience highest convergence speed, we still get a
non-positive relation between technological adoption and income per capita.
To investigate whether the characteristics of each technology play an important
role in stimulating its adoption speed, we study the average convergence speed for each in-
dustry. Table 23 reports the income per capita -convergence and the average -convergence
of technologies in each industry in period 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and 1973-2000 across
all countries. Table 24 reports the income per capita -convergence and the average -
convergence of technologies in each industry in period 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and 1973-2000
across DCs. Table 25 reports the income per capita -convergence and the average -
convergence of technological adoptions in each industry in period 1919 - 1938, 1946 - 1972
and 1973 - 2000 across LDCs. These tables show that most industries experience a decreas-
ing convergence rates and then increasing among the three periods.
Since the cross-sectional dispersion falls with ; the negative relation between the
dispersion of income and technology adoption implies enlarging dispersion of income per
capita across countries when the dispersion of technology adoption declines. From period
1919 - 1938 to period 1946 - 1972, since a new technology was adopted by DCs countries in
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very di¤erent date, the income inequality enlarges. Now because of the globalization, a new
technology is adopted by each developed country quickly, which results a positive relation
between the dispersion of income per capita and that of technological adoption among the
DCs from period 1946 - 1972 to period 1973 - 2000. For the developing countries, however,
there are still huge gaps among the dates to adopt a new technology in period 1973 - 2000.
As a result, the dispersion of per capita income and that of technology adoption are still
negative related across LDCs from period 1946 - 1972 to period 1973 - 2000. Since there are
137 developing countries and only 28 developed countries in CHAT data set, the relation
between income and technological adoption across all countries is dominated by developing
countries.
Hence, we conclude with another nding of our analysis:
Fact 5: The relation between the convergence speed of technology adoption and
that of per capita income is negative across all countries and across LDCs, but is positive
across DCs from period 1946 - 1972 to period 1973 - 2000.
Comin and Hobijn (2006) nd that the cross-country dispersion in technology
adoption for individual technology is 3 - 5 times larger than cross-country dispersion in
income. Using the same measurement provided by Comin and Hobijn (2006), we explore
the relation between the dispersion of the technological adoption and that of income per
capita across DCs and across LDCs.
For the technologies measured in log per capita or in log per real GDP, we compute
the cross-country variance of 5-year moving averages of each technology adoption level
after the year when it has been adopted in some countries. For the technologies measured
as shares, we compute the cross-developed-country (cross-developing-country) coe¢ cient
of variance of 5-year moving averages of each technology level for which we have data.
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We then compare the cross-developed-country (cross-developing-country) dispersion of each
technology with the cross-developed-country (cross-developing-country) dispersion of either
the log of income per capita (for log per capita and log per real GDP) or income per capita
(for shares) over 5 years for each interval over the same time period. We aggregate all
information across technologies both weighted by the length of our time series (measured
by the number of ve year periods for which we have data) and un-weighted. The results
are shown in Table 26, which indicates that the relation between the variation in technology
adoption and income across DCs and LDCs is consistent with the nding documented by
Comin and Hobijn (2006). It can be summarized as follows:
Fact 6: the dispersion in technology adoption for individual technologies is 3 - 5
times larger than the dispersion in income per capita both across DCs and LDCs.
Conclusion
This paper reanalyzes the Cross-Country Historical Adoption of Technology (CHAT)
data set. We estimate and compare the convergence speed of each technological adoption
and that of income per capita across all countries, and then across the developed and
developing countries (DCs and LDCs). We then document six new general facts about
cross-country technology adoption and income inequality that emerge from these data: (i)
Though DCs always adopt a new technology earlier than LDCs, on average the conver-
gence speed of technology adoption across LDCs is faster than that across DCs. (ii) Most
technological adoptions among poorer economies cluster in a lower level than those among
richer economies. (iii) The convergence speed of the adoption of most technologies is non-
monotone. (iv) The invention of the computer and the internet has not increased the average
convergence speed of other technological adoptions. (v) The relation between the average
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convergence speed of technological adoptions and that of per capita income is negative
across all countries and across LDCs, but is positive across DCs in the post-WWII period.
(vi) The dispersion in technology adoption for individual technology is 3 - 5 times larger
than the dispersion in income per capita both across DCs and LDCs. In addition, our paper
is the rst one in economics literature to adopt the graphical technique of Signicance in
Scale Space, a visualization method based on the gradient direction. This method avoids
the bandwidth selection when studying the joint kernel density. In future analysis, we will
try to provide a theoretical model to explain these ndings.
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Table 9. Technology variables and their measurement
Variable Variable Description Measurement
fert_total Fertilizer consumed, total on per capita basis
ag_harvester Harvesters on per capita basis
irrigatedarea Irrigated area on per capita basis
ag_milkingmachine Milking machines on per capita basis
pctirrigated Percent of irrigated land out of cultivated land share
pest_total Pesticide consumed, total on per capita basis
ag_tractor Tractors on per capita basis
atm ATMS on per capita basis
cheque Cheques issued on per capita basis
creditdebit Debit and credit card transactions on per capita basis
eft Electronic funds transfers on per capita basis
pos Points of service for debit/credit cards on per capita basis
elecprod Electricity production on per capita basis
internetuser Internet users on per capita basis
computer Personal computers on per capita basis
surg_appendectomy Appendectomies on per capita basis
bed_acute Beds: in-patient acute care on per capita basis
bed_longterm Beds: in-patient long-term care on per capita basis
bed_hosp Beds: total hospital on per capita basis
transplant_bonemarrow Bone marrow transplants on per capita basis
surg_breastcnsv Breast conservation surgeries on per capita basis
surg_csection Caesarean sections on per capita basis
surg_cardcath Cardiac catheterizations on per capita basis
surg_cataract Cataract surgeries on per capita basis
surg_cholecyst Cholecystectomies on per capita basis
surg_lapcholecyst Cholecystectomies, laparoscopic on per capita basis
med_catscanner Computed tomography (CAT) scanners on per capita basis
surg_corbypass Coronary bypasses on per capita basis
surg_corinterven Coronary Interventions, Percutaneous on per capita basis
surg_corstent Coronary stenting procedures on per capita basis
kidney_dialpat Dialysis patients on per capita basis
kidney_homedialpat Dialysis patients, home on per capita basis
transplant_heart Heart transplants on per capita basis
surg_hernia Hernia procedures, inguinal and femoral on per capita basis
surg_hipreplace Hip replacement surgeries on per capita basis
surg_hysterectomy Hysterectomies on per capita basis
transplant_kidney Kidney transplants on per capita basis
surg_kneereplace Knee replacement surgeries on per capita basis
med_lithotriptor Lithotripters on per capita basis
transplant_liver Liver transplants on per capita basis
transplant_lung Lung transplants on per capita basis
med_mammograph Number of dedicated mammographs machines on per capita basis
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Table 10. (Continued) Technology variables and their measurement
Variable Variable Description Measurement
surg_mastectomy Num. of mastectomies performed on per capita basis
med_mriunit Num. of MRI units on per capita basis
surg_pacemaker Pacemaker surgical procedures on per capita basis
pctimmunizdpt Per immunized for DPT, children 12-23 months share
pctimmunizmeas Per immunized for measles, children 12-23 months share
pctdaysurg_cataract Per of cataract surgeries done as day cases share
pctdaysurg_lapcholecyst Per of cholecystectomies done as day cases share
pctdaysurg_cholecyst Per of cholecystectomies done as day cases share
pcthomedialysis Per of dialysis patients at home share
pctdaysurg_hernia Per of hernia procedures done as day cases share
pctdaysurg_tonsil Per of tonsillectomies done as day cases share
pctdaysurg_varicosevein Per of varicose veins proc. done as day cases share
surg_prostatextrans Number of non-trans. prostatectomies performed on per capita basis
surg_prostatetrans Number of trans. prostatectomies performed on per capita basis
med_radiationequip Radiation therapy equipment on per capita basis
surg_tonsil Numer of tonsillectomies performed on per capita basis
surg_varicosevein Number of varicose vein corr. proc. performed on per capita basis
steel_stainless Stainless steel production on per capita basis
steel_acidbess Steel prod. by the acid Bessemer method share
steel_basicbess Steel prod. by the basic Bessemer method share
steel_bof Steel production in blast oxygen furnaces share
steel_eaf Steel production in electric arc furnaces share
steel_ohf Steel production in open hearth furnaces share
steel_other Steel production by other methods share
cabletv Cable television subscribers on per capita basis
cellphone Number of users of portable cell phones on per capita basis
mail Number of items mailed on per capita basis
newspaper Number of newspaper copies circulated daily on per capita basis
radio Number of radios on per capita basis
telegram Number of telegrams sent on per capita basis
telephone Number of mainline telephone lines on per capita basis
tv Number of television sets in use on per capita basis
loom_auto Looms: automatic on per capita basis
loom_total Looms: total on per capita basis
spindle_mule Number of mule spindles in place at year end on per capita basis
spindle_ring Number of ring spindles in place at year end on per capita basis
txtlmat_artif Spindle raw materials weight: artical bers share
txtlmat_otherraw Spindle raw materials weight: other share
txtlmat_synth Spindle raw materials weight: synthetic share
visitorbed Number of visitor beds available in hotels on per capita basis
visitorroom Number of visitor rooms available in hotels on per capita basis
84
Table 11. (Continued) Technology variables and their measurement
Variable Variable Description Measurement
aviationPKM Aviation: passenger kilometers on per capita basis
aviationTKM Aviation: freight ton-kilometers on unit real GDP basis
railTKM Railroads: freight ton-kilometers on unit real GDP basis
railT Railroads: freight ton-kilometers on unit real GDP basis
railline Railroads: length of line open on unit real GDP basis
railP Railroads: passenger journeys on per capita basis
railPKM Railroads: passenger kilometers on per capita basis
ship_motor Number of motor ships in use at midyear share
ship_sail Number of sail ships in use at midyear share
ship_steam Num. of steam ships in use at midyear share
ship_steammotor Num of steam&motor ships in use at midyear share
shipton_motor Ton of motor ships in use at midyear share
shipton_sail Ton of sail ships in use at midyear share
shipton_steam Ton of steam ships in use at midyear share
shipton_steammotor Ton of steam&motor ships in use at midyear share
vehicle_com Num of comm. vehicles, including buses & taxis on per capita basis
vehicle_car Num of passenger cars in use on per capita basis
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Table 12. Invention data and  convergence rate across all countries, DCs and LDCs for
technologies based on per-capita or per-unit-real-GDP
Variable Invention date 
All DCs se LDCs se
ship_sail pre-1500 0.02 0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.012
surg_appendectomy 1885 0.037 0.139 0.095 0.007 0.190
kidney_dialpat 1943 0.065 0.043 0.006 0.009 0.028
surg_corbypass 1953 0.036 0.104 0.030 0.048 0.046
tv 1924 0.009 0.076 0.005 0.042 0.003
txtlamat_totalraw 1884 0.134 0.164 0.040 0.104 0.022
telephone 1876 0.041 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.002
med_radiationequip 1900 0.083 0.087 0.042 0.066 0.054
steel_stainless 1913 0.022 0.248 0.043 0.189 0.099
railP 1825 0.013 0.015 0.002 0.011 0.004
railPKM 1825 -0.002 0.015 0.003 0.011 0.005
railTKM 1825 0.008 0.018 0.006 0.014 0.006
txtlmat_synth 1884 0.126 0.148 0.021 0.115 0.022
surg_hipreplace 1938 0.025 0.129 0.052 0.114 0.306
transplant_bonemarrow 1956 0.043 0.066 0.017 0.060 0.046
transplant_liver 1967 0.112 0.095 0.018 0.087 0.090
shipton: total pre-1500 0.009 0.031 0.006 0.029 0.005
med_mriunit 1981 0.054 0.058 0.016 0.054 0.089
surg_pacemaker 1952 0.028 0.066 0.080 0.063 0.277
med_catscanner 1972 0.037 0.061 0.012 0.058 0.051
vehicle_com 1885 0.024 0.021 0.002 0.021 0.003
shipton_steammotor 1788 0.02 0.026 0.005 0.027 0.005
vehicle_car 1885 0.055 0.013 0.002 0.015 0.003
loom_auto 1801 0.001 0.156 0.041 0.176 0.027
bed_hosp pre-1500 0.082 0.061 0.022 0.070 0.025
irrigatedarea pre-1500 0.012 0.026 0.005 0.030 0.004
aviationTKM 1903 0.033 0.031 0.005 0.036 0.007
bed_longterm pre-1500 0.011 0.049 0.012 0.058 0.072
transplant_heart 1967 0.093 0.157 0.023 0.189 0.132
steel_eaf 1900 0.048 0.051 0.009 0.065 0.012
cellphone 1947 0.033 0.038 0.006 0.048 0.008
kidney_dialpat 1943 0.069 0.073 0.014 0.093 0.084
eft 1979 0.02 0.069 0.020 0.088 0.053
telegram 1835 0.001 0.037 0.006 0.048 0.009
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at
10%.
86
Table 13. (Continued) Invention data and  convergence rate across all countries, DCs and
LDCs for technologies based on per-capita or per-unit-real-GDP
Variable Invention date 
All DCs se LDCs se
steel_bof 1950 -0.027 0.135 0.011 0.177 0.018
radio 1901 0.004 0.019 0.002 0.025 0.002
pos 1950 0.148 0.095 0.021 0.129 0.030
ag_milkingmachine 1870 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.022 0.007
computer 1973 0.082 0.040 0.005 0.057 0.006
loom_total 1785 0.123 0.101 0.034 0.145 0.026
steel_ohf 1867 0.025 -0.030 0.021 -0.044 0.030
surg_csection pre-1500 0.03 0.052 0.046 0.078 0.195
cabletv 1949 0.015 0.085 0.011 0.132 0.021
pest_total 1939 0.164 0.315 0.073 0.490 0.051
aviationPKM 1903 0.047 0.016 0.003 0.026 0.004
visitorbed pre-1500 0.011 0.042 0.015 0.070 0.012
ship_steammotor 1788 0.002 0.018 0.007 0.031 0.006
fert_total 1815 0.004 0.045 0.013 0.078 0.007
transplant_kidney 1951 0.229 0.060 0.010 0.106 0.038
visitorroom pre-1500 0.035 0.028 0.017 0.050 0.010
ag_tractor 1868 0.007 0.017 0.003 0.032 0.003
creditdebit 1950 -0.002 0.037 0.015 0.067 0.065
elecprod 1882 0.01 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.002
surg_hysterectomy 1843 0.028 0.207 0.079 0.391 0.108
ag_harvester 1850 0.008 0.012 0.003 0.025 0.004
med_lithotriptor 1980 0.02 0.129 0.029 0.277 0.147
mail pre-1500 0.02 0.007 0.001 0.015 0.004
internetuser 1973 0.078 0.049 0.009 0.107 0.010
surg_cholecyst 1882 0.002 0.081 0.106 0.183 0.108
ships: total pre-1500 0.033 0.017 0.006 0.046 0.007
txtlmat_artif 1884 0.073 0.082 0.047 0.223 0.115
atm 1967 0.148 0.049 0.014 0.148 0.023
surg_tonsil pre-1500 0.023 0.203 0.113 0.648 0.459
newspaper 1606 0.041 0.010 0.006 0.032 0.005
shipton_steam 1788 0.001 0.018 0.006 0.058 0.037
surg_hernia pre-1500 0.122 0.169 0.110 0.589 0.123
surg_mastectomy pre-1500 -0.002 0.165 0.089 0.726 0.248
surg_cardcath 1941 0.044 0.040 0.040 0.195 0.210
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at
10%.
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Table 14. (Continued) Invention data and  convergence rate across all countries, DCs and
LDCs for technologies based on per-capita or per-unit-real-GDP
Variable Invention date 
All DCs se LDCs se
surg_cataract 1748 0.072 0.040 0.040 0.195 0.210
med_mammograph 1966 0.104 0.022 0.021 0.117 0.081
txtlmat_otherraw 1884 0.230 0.088 0.064 0.607 0.103
railT 1825 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.005
surg_kneereplace 1970 0.016 0.057 0.036 0.663 0.564
ship_steam 1788 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.055 0.025
surg_prostatextrans 1883 0.024 0.044 0.064 0.667 0.525
spindle_ring 1828 0.015 0.033 0.032 0.657 0.064
spindle_mule 1779 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.003 0.015
shipton_motor 1897 0.039 0.004 0.006
ship_motor 1897 0.024 0.009 0.008
steel_basicbess 1855 0.082 0.119 0.075
surg_corstent 1980 0.059 0.120 0.066
surg_prostatetrans 1931 0.051 0.145 0.070
surg_breastcnsv pre-1500 0.022 0.160 0.087
surg_lapcholecyst 1901 0.039 0.180 0.051
steel_acidbess 1855 0.08 0.192 0.065
transplant_lung 1963 0.118 0.204 0.033
surg_corbypass 1953 0.033
surg_varicosevein pre-1500 0.033 -0.041 0.121 0.279 0.227
shipton_sail pre-1500 0.027 -0.002 0.004 0.010 0.016
railline 1825 0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.009 0.005
bed_acute pre-1500 0.035 -0.015 0.010 0.025 0.017
cheque pre-1500 0.059 -0.073 0.032 0.022 0.112
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at
10%.
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Table 15. Invention data and  convergence rate across all countries, DCs and LDCs for
technologies measured in share
Variable Invention date 
All DCs se LDCs se
pctdaysurg_cataract 1748 0.039 -0.019 0.026 0.366 0.120
pctdaysurg_varicosevein pre-1500 0.007 0.031 0.037 -0.215 0.746
pctimmunizdpt 1927 0.086 0.158 0.024 0.082 0.009
pctloom_auto 1801 0.063 1.275 0.055 0.742 0.038
pctirrigated pre-1500 -0.005 0.015 0.006 0.011 0.003
pctimmunizmeas 1964 0.119 0.110 0.018 0.102 0.010
pctshipton_steammotor 1788 0.007 0.014 0.004 0.016 0.004
pctsteel_ohf 1855 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.016
pctship_steammotor 1788 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.002
pctsteel_bof 1950 0.061 0.058 0.012 0.081 0.016
pctship_sail pre-1500 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009
pctsteel_eaf 1900 0.015 0.027 0.011 0.048 0.011
pctspindle_ring 1828 0.025 0.019 0.020 0.049 0.036
pctdaysurg_tonsil pre-1500 0.001 0.223 0.069 0.598 0.177
pctship_steam 1788 0.051 0.039 0.012 0.198 0.064
pctshipton_sail pre-1500 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.041 0.015
pctshipton_steam 1788 0.025 0.019 0.008 0.174 0.067
pctdaysurg_hernia pre-1500 0.009 0.024 0.034 1.880 0.433
pctdaysurg_cholecyst 1882 -0.145 0.010 0.042
pctdaysurg_lapcholecyst 1901 -0.133 0.042 0.053
pcthomedialysis 1943 0.021 4.074 0.000
pctship_motor 1897 0.009 0.009 0.008
pctshipton_motor 1897 0.004 0.004 0.006
pctsteel_acidbess 1855 0.276 0.597 0.078
pctsteel_basicbess 1855 0.023 0.002 0.039
pctsteel_other 1855 0.04 0.173 0.072
pctsteel_stainless 1913 -0.005
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at 10%.
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Table 16. Summary of kernel density estimates and their feature tests of technologies
measured on per capita basis
Technologies Year Observations Modality Multi-modality test Bandwidth for test
Bed_hosp 1960 97 2 Not clear 5-6
1970 97 2 Clear 5-6
1980 69 2 Clear 5-6
1990 120 2 Clear 5-6
visitorbed 1980 98 2 Clear 5-6
1990 94 3 Clear 5-6
2000 88 2 Clear 5-6
visitorroom 1980 99 2 Clear 5-6
1990 95 3 Clear 5-6
2000 95 2 Clear 5-6
Newspaper 1960 91 2 Clear 5-6
1970 101 3 Clear 5-6
1980 115 3 Clear 5-6
1990 115 2 Clear 5-6
1999 102 2 Clear 5-6
Railp 1960 85 3 Clear 5-6
1970 84 3 Clear 5-6
1980 72 3 Clear 5-6
Tractors 1970 108 2 Clear 5-6
1980 118 3 Clear 5-6
1990 119 3 Clear 5-6
2000 109 2 Clear 5-6
Telephones 1960 98 2 Not clear 5-6
1970 101 2 Clear 5-6
1980 103 3 Clear 5-6
1990 86 2 Clear 5-6
Elecprod 1950 94 1 Not clear 5-6
1960 106 2 Not clear 5-6
1970 115 2 Clear 5-6
1980 118 2 Clear 5-6
1990 120 3 Clear 5-6
2000 75 2 Clear 5-6
Vehicle_car 1960 101 2 Clear 5-6
1970 107 2 Clear 5-6
1980 106 2 Clear 5-6
1990 120 2 Clear 5-6
Vehicle_com 1960 103 2 Not clear 5-6
1970 106 2 Not clear 5-6
1980 105 2 Clear 5-6
1990 94 3 Clear 5-6
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Table 17. (Continued) Summary of kernel density estimates and their feature tests of
technologies measured on per capita basis
Technologies Year Observations Modality Multi-modality test Bandwidth for test
Radios 1960 94 3 Clear 5-6
1970 112 3 Clear 5-6
1980 117 3 Clear 5-6
1990 119 3 Clear 5-6
1999 115 3 Clear 5-6
Aviationpkm 1960 74 2 Clear 5-6
1970 92 2 Clear 5-6
1980 96 3 Clear 5-6
1990 97 3 Clear 5-6
TVs 1970 90 2 Not clear 5-6
1980 113 2 Clear 5-6
1990 139 1 Clear 5-6
Cell phones 1995 105 2 Clear 5-6
2000 110 2 Clear 5-6
Computers 1995 92 2 Clear 5-6
2000 103 3 Clear 5-6
Internet users 1995 96 2 Clear 5-6
2000 110 2 Clear 5-6
Textlmat_artif 1975 70 2 Clear 6-7
1979 70 1 Not clear 6-7
Txtlmat_synth 1975 71 2 Clear 6-7
1979 73 1 Not clear 6-7
Steel_EAF 1995 82 2 Clear 6-7
2000 69 2 Clear 6-7
Irrigated area 1970 114 2 Not clear 7-8
1980 115 2 Not clear 7-8
1990 116 1 Not clear 7-8
2000 108 2 Not clear 7-8
Fert 1970 113 2 Clear 7-8
1980 117 3 Clear 7-8
1990 117 2 Not clear 7-8
2000 109 1 Not clear 7-8
Railpkm 1960 76 2 Clear 7-8
1970 83 2 Clear 7-8
1980 80 3 Clear 7-8
1989 71 2 Clear 7-8
Harvesters 1970 87 2 Clear 7-8
1980 87 2 Clear 7-8
1990 88 2 Clear 7-8
2000 90 1 Not clear 7-8
Cable TV 2000 72 2 Not clear 7-8
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Table 18. Summary of kernel density estimates and their feature tests of technologies
measured on share and on unit real GDP based
Technologies Year Observations Modality Multi-modality test Bandwidth for test
In unit real GDP
Railline 1960 94 1 Not clear 7-8
1970 93 1 Not clear 7-8
1980 87 2 Not clear 7-8
1990 87 2 Not clear 7-8
RailT 1960 88 2 Clear 7-8
1970 88 2 Clear 7-8
1980 73 2 Clear 7-8
RailTKM 1960 83 2 Not clear 7-8
1970 88 2 Clear 7-8
1980 86 2 Clear 7-8
1990 82 2 Clear 7-8
Aviationtkm 1970 89 3 Clear 7-8
1980 95 1 Not clear 7-8
1990 92 2 Clear 7-8
In share
pctirrigated 1970 114 1 Not clear 5-6
1980 115 2 Not clear 5-6
1990 116 2 Clear 5-6
2000 108 1 Not clear 5-6
pct_txtlmat_artif 1975 70 1 Not clear 5-6
1979 70 1 Not clear 5-6
pct_txtlmat_synth 1975 71 2 Clear 5-6
1979 73 2 Not clear 5-6
pct_steel_eaf 1995 82 3 Clear 7-8
2000 69 3 Clear 7-8
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Table 19. Each technology -convergence rates in 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and 1973-2000
across all countries
Variable 1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
 se  se  se
Agriculture
fert_total 0.095 0.016 0.126 0.011
harvester 0.050 0.013 0.019 0.004
irrigated area 0.052 0.014 0.045 0.006
milking machines 0.062 0.016 0.016 0.008
pctirrigated 0.054 0.014 0.022 0.004
pest_total 0.475 0.042
tractors 0.065 0.008 0.029 0.004
Financial
ATM 0.090 0.017
cheque 0.031
creditdebit 0.067 0.032
eft 0.073 0.023
pos 0.094 0.023
General
elecprod 0.030 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.042 0.005
internetuser 0.098 0.010
computer 0.057 0.005
Health
appendectomies 0.206 0.097
bed_acute -0.009 0.010
bed_longterm 0.073 0.031 0.043 0.018
bed_hosp 0.079 0.021
transplant_bonemarrow 0.064 0.017
surg_breastcnsv 0.171 0.098
surg_csection 0.062 0.049
surg_cardcath 0.080 0.034
surg_cataract 0.052 0.041
surg_cholecyst 0.130 0.112
surg_lapcholecyst 0.215 0.051
med_catscanner 0.060 0.020
surg_corbypass 0.075 0.024
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at 10%.
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Table 20. (Continued) Each technology -convergence rates in 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and
1973-2000 across all countries
Variable 1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
 se  se  se
surg_corinterven 0.087 0.029
surg_corstent 0.107 0.075
Dialysis patients 0.033 0.007
Dialysis patients, home 0.086 0.017
heart transplante 0.163 0.026
surg_hernia 0.353 0.097
surg_hipreplace 0.130 0.062
surg_hysterectomy 0.272 0.080
kidney transplants 0.106 0.078 0.079 0.014
surg_kneereplace 0.067 0.043
lithotripters 0.145 0.032
liver transplants 0.096 0.020
lung transplant 0.221 0.036
mammographs 0.079 0.042
surg_mastectomy 0.200 0.090
MRI units 0.061 0.024
surg_pacemaker 0.115 0.093
pctimmunizdpt 0.092 0.009
pctimmunizmeas 0.107 0.010
pctdaysurg_cataract -0.030 0.032
pctdaysurg_lapcholecyst 0.062 0.067
pctdaysurg_cholecyst
pcthomedialysis 0.098 0.028
pctdaysurg_hernia
pctdaysurg_tonsil 0.271 0.062
pctdaysurg_varicosevein
surg_prostatextrans
surg_prostatetrans 0.185 0.080
med_radiationequip 0.072 0.044
surg_tonsil 0.228 0.104
surg_varicosevein
steel
steel stainless 0.215 0.050
steel_acidbess 0.600 0.081
steel_basicbess 0.072 0.060 0.158 0.032
steel_bof 0.091 0.014
steel_eaf 0.088 0.03 0.045 0.009
steel_ohf 0.014 0.018 0.015 0.016
steel_other 0.113 0.058
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at 10%.
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Table 21. (Continued) Each technology -convergence rates in 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and
1973-2000 across all countries
Variable 1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
 se  se  se
telecommunications
cabletv 0.103 0.012
cell phones 0.046 0.007
mail 0.100 0.020 0.058 0.010 0.055 0.014
newspaper 0.066 0.007 0.036 0.007
radio 0.083 0.028 0.036 0.004 0.028 0.004
telegram 0.563 0.033 0.040 0.012
telephone 0.049 0.012 0.020 0.005 0.008 0.005
TV 0.091 0.008 0.042 0.004
Textiles
looms: automatic 0.211 0.033 0.577 0.046
looms: total 0.085 0.032 0.480 0.043
spindle_mule 0.125 0.093 0.147 0.084
spindle_ring 0.135 0.069 1.260 0.055
txtlmat_artif 0.288 0.039 0.389 0.047
txtlmat_otherraw 0.943 0.180 0.139 0.091
txtlmat_synth 0.120 0.040 0.188 0.041*
Tourism
visitorbed 0.075 0.011
visitorroom 0.051 0.010
Transportation
aviationPKM 0.085 0.031 0.057 0.007 0.073 0.011
aviationtkm 0.059 0.009 0.092 0.012
railtkm 0.207 0.034 0.052 0.011 0.049 0.012
railt 0.077 0.021 0.039 0.010 0.054 0.013
railline 0.058 0.018 0.035 0.008
railp 0.089 0.016 0.050 0.011 0.040 0.014
railpkm 0.059 0.022 0.058 0.011 0.027 0.013
ship_motor 0.023 0.021
ship_sail 0.041 0.020 0.055 0.027
ship_steam 0.170 0.082 0.093 0.027 0.308 0.092
ship_steammotor 0.049 0.024 0.088 0.015
shipton_motor 0.013 0.013
shipton_sail 0.075 0.026 0.232 0.018 0.116 0.082
shipton_steam 0.037 0.034 0.032 0.017 0.182 0.051
shipton_steammotor 0.151 0.030 0.135 0.012 0.125 0.007
vehicle_com 0.077 0.010 0.045 0.006 0.051 0.009
vehicle_car 0.073 0.010 0.028 0.005 0.044 0.007
Note: *** means signicant at 1%, ** means signicant at 5% and * means signicant at 10%.
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Table 22. Average -convergence speed of technologies and income per capita in 1919-1938,
1946-1972 and 1973-2000 across all countries, DCs as well as LDCs
1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
All countries   
Per capita Income 0.068 0.010 0.028
Average  of tech_adoption 0.111 0.137 0.115
Developed countries   
Per capita Income 0.074 0.010 0.006
Average  of tech_adoption 0.109 0.128 0.099
Developing countries   
Per capita Income 0.063 0.011 0.036
Average  of tech_adoption 0.124 0.196 0.158
Table 23. Income per capita  convergence rate and average  convergence rate in each
department in 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and 1973-2000 across all countries
1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
All countries   
Income per capita 0.068 0.010 0.028
Agriculture 0.063 0.105
Finance 0.081
Electricity 0.031 0.024 0.042
Internet 0.098
Computer 0.057
Bed_longterm 0.073 0.043
Kidney_transplants 0.106 0.079
Health 0.090 0.118
Steel 0.177 0.105
Telecommunication 0.199 0.052 0.046
Textile 0.130 0.436 0.354
Tourism 0.063
Transportation 0.089 0.066 0.092
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Table 24. Income per capita  convergence rate and average  convergence rate in each
department in 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and 1973-2000 across DCs
1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
Developed countries   
Income per capita 0.074 0.010 0.006
Agriculture 0.060 0.069
Finance 0.045
Electricity 0.025 0.011 0.021
Internet 0.039
Computer 0.041
Bed_acute 0.027 -0.014
bed_longterm 0.071 0.040
Kidney_transplants 0.101 0.060
Health 0.066 0.111
Steel 0.177 0.132
Telecommunication 0.215 0.053 0.026
Textile 0.105 0.384 0.314
Tourism 0.037
Transportation 0.085 0.060 0.078
Table 25. Income per capita  convergence rate and average  convergence rate in each
department in 1919-1938, 1946-1972 and 1973-2000 across LDCs
1919-1938 1946-1972 1973-2000
Developing countries   
Income per capita 0.063 0.011 0.036
Agriculture 0.066 0.107
Finance 0.158
Electricity 0.035 0.026 0.045
Internet 0.125
Computer 0.062
Health 0.229
Steel 0.811 0.087
Telecommunication 0.194 0.058 0.051
Textile 0.214 0.502 0.407
Tourism 0.065
Transportation 0.093 0.078 0.060
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Table 26. Dispersion in technology adoption relative to dispersion in income per capita
DCs Average dispersion Percentage of instances with ratios>1
Log per capita Share All Log per capita Share All
Weighted by # of
5-Year Intervals 3.97 2.36 3.99 100 79 93
Un-weighted 4.15 3.54 3.98 99 85 96
LDCs Average dispersion Percentage of instances with ratios>1
Log per capita Share All Log per capita Share All
Weighted by # of
5-Year Intervals 3.48 1.43 3.12 98 51 90
Un-weighted 5.21 1.55 4.45 92 57 85
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Figure 6: Kernel density estimates and their corresponding contour plots of income per capita 
and electricity production in year 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 
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Figure 7: Significance in Scale-Space analysis of the joint density of income per capita and 
electricity production at year 1950 
 
 
 
Note: Figures 7 – 12 show the streamlines for each corresponding kernel density estimate. The x-axis 
represents income per capita, the y-axis represents electricity production, and h represents bandwidth. The 
color white is used for all regions where the density is higher than 20% of its maximum and the color black 
is used for the minimum. The green ‘streamlines’ indicate the gradient direction and therefore the structure 
of a surface. The purple lines ate contour lines, which are orthogonal to the green gradient lines. Statistical 
significant cluster will be highlighted by a purple circle surrounding it, because it will be a hill of high 
density. 
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Figure 8: Significance in Scale-Space analysis of the joint density of income per capita and 
electricity production at year 1960 
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Figure 9: Significance in Scale-Space analysis of the joint density of income per capita and 
electricity production at year 1970 
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Figure 10: Significance in Scale-Space analysis of the joint density of income per capita and 
electricity production at year 1980 
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Figure 11: Significance in Scale-Space analysis of the joint density of income per capita and 
electricity production at year 1990 
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Figure 12: Significance in Scale-Space analysis of the joint density of income per capita and 
electricity production at year 2000 
 
 
